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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis seeks to identify if, in the course of the United States’ and 
NATO’s democratic institution-building efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United 
States and NATO are offering a viable model of how military professionals 
interact with a healthy democratic society.  Because the understanding of how 
military professionals should interact with society as a whole is often flawed in 
the United States and other developed democratic states, this study will research 
how well the United States and NATO are presenting a realistic model to 
professional soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This study begins with a broad look 
at civil-military relations theory and examines select historical examples of 
professional soldiers exceeding their purview in developed countries such as the 
United States and Britain.  The Yugoslav People’s Army’s political history is 
surveyed to examine the political involvement of professional soldiers in politics 
in the former state of Yugoslavia.  Lastly, this study will examine contemporary 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND THE POLITICAL 
SOLDIER 
1. Primary Question 
 This thesis will seek to answer the following question: In the course of the 
United States’ and NATO’s democratic institution-building efforts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, does the United States and NATO offer a realistic model of how 
military professionals should interact politically within a healthy democratic 
society?   
Within American society there is great confusion regarding appropriate 
and inappropriate political involvement by our professional soldiers.  Civil military 
theorists differ about what constitutes ideal political involvement by professional 
soldiers in a democracy.  Samuel Huntington regards a soldier’s absence from 
the political realm to be the hallmark of their professionalism, especially in 
societies that face few existential threats.1  Janowitz differs with him by saying 
that military professionals are by their nature political because of their 
responsibilities within a democratic society.2  S.E. Finer’s four levels of political 
involvement by the military provide a more nuanced perspective by which the 
military’s political involvement in a society can be judged to be healthy.  If limited 
to “influence,” a military can positively interact with society through the press and 
through congressional lobbying.3 
An accurate understanding of the political nature of professional soldiers is 
important so efforts to better educate our military professionals can be 
undertaken and so democratic societies can recognize unhealthy behavior when 
it occurs.  This will also improve security sector reform efforts in new 
                                            
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State – The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 97. 
2 Morris Janowitz, Professional Soldier (The Free Press: New York, 1960), 12. 
3 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
9.  Finer’s four levels are: influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplantation. 
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democracies by providing military and civilian authorities with a durable and 
realistic model of democratic civil-military relations. 
a. Are Political Skills Useful to Professional Soldiers in 
Democratic States? 
Once free of the myth that professional soldiers can exist in 
isolation from politics in a democratic society, it is easy to see that politically 
astute soldiers can greatly benefit their institution and foster a more healthy 
democratic civil-military relationship.  Soldiers that recognize their constitutional 
relationship with the society as a whole and who understand the appropriate 
political channels in which to interact with that society are less likely to violate 
proper professional ethics and norms in their pursuit of their professional duties.  
Additionally, politically astute and disciplined military leaders are better able to 
craft appropriate plans for their civilian leadership when they understand the 
greater context of their military plans in times of both war and peace. 
Professional soldiers run afoul of democratic norms when they fail 
to grasp the greater political, social, and cultural context of the military planning 
and operations.  Military leaders often perpetuate a false premise that operations 
or tactics can be neatly separated from the political realm.  In the 1860s, Helmuth 
von Moltke (the Elder) strove to establish boundaries in the 1860s that political 
leadership should not violate.4  Gen. Douglas MacArthur made his efforts in the 
1950s,5 and most recently military retirees in the United States made assertions 
that the secretary of Defense had overstepped his authority by overruling “years 
of military planning” in the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.6   
The last two examples serve as glaring reminders that military 
professionals who fail to grasp their proper role in a democratic society have 
failed in their responsibilities to that society.  Military leaders should never allow 
                                            
4 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (New York: The Oxford University 
Press, 1955), 188. 
5 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron – Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National 
Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1998), 331-333. 
6 John Batiste (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.S. Army), interview with Bob Shieffer, Washington, D.C., 
April 23, 2006 and John Batiste (Maj. Gen. (ret.), U.S. Army), interview with Harry Smith, New 
York, April 12, 2006. 
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their disagreements with civilian leaders’ judgments to skew their understanding 
of the important role they serve as military professionals in a democratic society. 
b. What Historical Examples Exist in Yugoslavia’s Past that 
can be Used to Illustrate Constructive and Positive 
Political Involvement by the Military? 
  Understanding that Yugoslavia was a communist state and that 
civil-military relations in a democracy is an entirely different affair than that which 
existed in communist countries, there are historical examples of professionalism 
and respect for constitutional law that one can glean from the Yugoslav People’s 
Army political history.  There were some surprising precedents set during the 
Yugoslav state’s history that were not seen anywhere else in communist 
Europe.7  After Tito’s death we find more examples of senior military leadership 
defending the constitution against nationalist demagogues such as Slobodan 
Milosević. 
  Yugoslavia’s history is also replete with examples of poor 
professional behavior by its military professionals.  During the Yugoslav crisis of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the senior military leadership missed 
opportunities that could have cooled tensions between the republics; however, 
the military’s misguided and ham-fisted attempts to influence political decisions 
outside of its purview perpetuated the conflict at its most critical time.8 
  Because of its multi-ethnic nature, the Yugoslav People’s Army’s 
(YPA) history has other valuable lessons for today’s Bosnian military.  The YPA 
sought to serve as a truly pan-Yugoslav organization and took measures to 
ensure its various ethnic groups were adequately represented among its ranks.9  
                                            
7 James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1992), 48.  One example of this exceptionalism is that military budgets were actually 
questioned by republican authorities during the 1960s when nationalist sentiments and a desire 
for butter versus guns prompted pressure on the military to defend its budgets.  
8 Ibid., 140.  General Veljko Kadijević served as the Federal Secretary for National Defense 
during the Yugoslav crisis and endorsed a new political party that re-affirmed communist ideals 
and opposed the Federal Prime Minister’s efforts to reform the economy and attract foreign 
investment.  This political foray by the military into an area so clearly outside of its area of 
expertise served to affirm republican fears of an overly political military. 
9 A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch 
(Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 20. 
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Its political blundering on matters of ethnicity served to exacerbate tensions in 
Slovenia in the early 1990s, which led to the secession of Slovenia from 
Yugoslavia.10 
c. What Improvements can be Made to Help the Bosnian 
Military Professionals to Develop Healthy Political 
Skills? 
  Since the Dayton Accords were signed in 1995 there has been a 
deep involvement by Western democracies in the development of Bosnia’s 
institutions, especially its military establishment.  These efforts have gained 
momentum since 2003, as international patience with slow progress reached its 
nadir and as Bosnian foreign-policy goals changed to include aspirations for 
NATO and European Union membership.11 
  Security sector reform has come very far and some structural flaws 
enshrined in Dayton have been overcome.12  Political reform is desperately 
needed to complete Bosnia-Herzegovina’s transition to a viable democratic state.   
  Political activity by the military can be healthy and tolerable under 
the right conditions.  Democratic norms, practices, and institutions are critical to 
keep the military’s involvement at a proper level.13  Without these norms and 
institutions, the symbiotic relationship between the military and the society it 
serves can become dysfunctional.   
                                            
10 James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1992), 78-88.  The case involved the prosecution of a Slovenian serviceman who had 
leaked information to a Slovenian nationalist publication.  This incident is covered more 
thoroughly in Chapter III. 
11  In Lieutenant General Podžić’s closing comments at a seminar for Bosnia’s general 
officers on January 25, 2006 he stated that the military’s most important mission is to gain 
membership in PfP and eventually gain full membership in NATO.  This reflected a decision by 
the Tri-Presidency that Bosnia should make itself a viable candidate for full NATO membership, 
rather than confining itself to membership in just PfP.  See also AFBIH: A Single Military Force for 
the 21st Century – Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report.  Sarajevo: n.p., September 2005, 
181. 
12 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 362. “The most 
serious flaw in the Dayton Peace Accords was that it left two opposing armies in on country, one 
for Serbs and one for the Croat-Muslim Federation.” 
13 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
19. “[W]hat limits the impact of their intervention is not that the army is inherently apolitical – 
because it is not – but the political culture within which the army is operating.” 
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  We will see that Bosnia’s military leadership has enthusiastically 
embraced reform and democratic ideals.  Their further development, however, is 
limited by the political atmosphere in which they operate. 
B. SOURCES AND METHODS 
 Chapter II provides an examination of civil-military theory, as well as 
selected historical examples of political involvement by the military.  It focuses on 
civil-military tensions during periods of war and peace.  Through a multitude of 
examples it seeks to illuminate both healthy and unhealthy political involvement 
by military professionals. 
 Chapter III is a historical examination of the Yugoslav People’s Army and 
its political involvement from 1941–1991.  It includes a case study of General 
Veljko Kadijević who served as the Federal Secretary for National Defense from 
1988-1991.  His successes and failures serve as examples of the serious impact 
professional soldiers can have on the health of their polity, and ultimately their 
society. 
 Chapter IV is an examination of contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina and its 
democratic structures’ development.  I focus on security sector reform, but I also 
examine the impact that retarded political development can have on the 
sustainability of healthy civil-military relations.  The research for this chapter 
included a trip to Sarajevo funded by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Civil-Military Relations (CCMR).  The trip afforded me opportunities to interview 
senior Department of Defense officials, as well as retired military officers from 
both the United States and Britain who have been heavily involved in security 
sector reform in Bosnia for more than 10 years. 
 Chapter V offers some broad observations regarding Bosnia’s security 
sector reform some recommendations for more effective democratic institution 
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 7
II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY AND THE 
POLITICAL SOLDIER 
A. THE MYTH OF THE APOLITICAL PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 
1. Introduction 
 In the late 1950s Samuel Huntington, in The Soldier and the State, and 
Morris Janowitz, in The Professional Soldier, offered diametrically opposed 
theories regarding military professionalism and politicization.  Huntington’s model 
professes that the hallmark of a soldier is to be apolitical.  Janowitz argued the 
opposite, that, the more professional soldiers become, the more they would 
become involved in democratic politics.  Both works were produced during the 
deep Cold War when America was grappling with the ramifications of maintaining 
a large nuclear armed force in a time of peace.  The problem of how to maintain 
civilian control of the military in a democracy is an important one but not one that 
is easily arrived at through the process of deductive reasoning14 for it is much too 
complex and contains too many caveats and grey areas to allow for conclusions 
to be drawn without the benefit of cross-cultural historical data. 
 An understanding of the political nature of professional soldiers is 
important, however, because it has broad implications for the development of 
professional militaries in newly democratic post-communist states and nascent 
democratic states in the Arab world.  It also has significant implications in the 
United States for its fight against terrorism when the potential exists for the 
military to exceed its bounds and the line between police functions and military 
functions becomes increasingly grey.  It is important for the U.S. soldier-diplomat 
to understand the political nature of a professional force in order to maintain 
proper civilian control through the use of structures, norms, and procedures.  
 In our education efforts in post-communist societies it is important to 
portray a realistic model of civil-military relations to include frank assessments of 
                                            
14 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question 
of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1996): 14. 
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the political nature of professional soldiers as well as the appropriate institutions 
and procedures necessary to limit the political influence of the military.15 
 Samuel Huntington’s assertions that professional soldiers are by definition 
apolitical does not stand up to scrutiny.  Morris Janowitz was correct in his 
assessment of the professional and political soldier.16  Janowitz’s complete 
model of civil-military relations is also flawed, but in other respects.17  It is useful 
to view military intervention through the prism of Samuel Finer’s four levels of 
military intervention in politics to understand what is meant by the military’s 
involvement in domestic politics.  Judging whether or not a military establishment 
is political by simply looking at whether or not there has been a coup is surely not 
sufficient.18 
 Janowitz and Huntington may not have been realistic to ascribe political 
restraint to the internal mechanisms of a professional military, but it is useful 
when internal restraints on political activity are in place.  Professional Military 
Education should stress the proper role of the military in the democratic political 
spectrum, fully outlining the advantages to civilian authority in the security policy 
realm.  Additionally, military regulations should prohibit partisan activity that in 
any way compromises the neutrality of the military in partisan squabbles.  With 
this in mind, we must understand that the professional soldier is a political being 
                                            
15 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback – The Role of the Military in Politics (Pall Mall 
Press: London, 1962), 86.  Influence is one of Finer’s four levels of military involvement in politics.  
The others are blackmail, displacement and supplantation.  Finer says the military engages in 
influence when it makes an “effort to convince the civil authorities by appealing to their reason or 
their emotions.”  He describes this activity as entirely appropriate. 
16 Morris Janowitz, Professional Soldier (The Free Press: New York, 1960), 12.  “The growth 
of the military establishment into a vast managerial enterprise with increased political 
responsibilities has produced a strain on traditional military self-images and concepts of honor…. 
As a result, the profession, especially within its strategic leadership, has developed a more 
explicit political ethos.” 
17 See Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the 
Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1996): 12.  “In emphasizing the 
role of professionalism…both Huntington and Janowitz are vulnerable to charges of defining 
away the problem of civilian control.  Both Janowitz and Huntington rely on internal mechanisms 
to ensure civilian control.  Janowitz believes that, although professional soldiers are political, that 
same professionalism will ultimately also constrain their political involvement.  In reality, 
mechanisms and procedures external to the military are necessary to ensure civilian control. 
18 Ibid., 4. 
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who can well serve the polity while possessing a keen political sense that 
understands the military’s proper role in society. 
 Most importantly, we have to recognize that civilian control of an 
organization with the authority to exercise force is a messy and complex process 
that requires constant vigilance in the enforcement of professional norms and 
appropriate behavior by civilians and military professionals alike.  Military 
professionals who seek to use the cover of professional opinion to engage in 
partisan political activity harm both their institution and the polity just as surely as 
civilians who fail to sufficiently supervise and challenge their military 
subordinates. 
2. Civilian Supremacy and Responsibility 
 Military professionals, civilian leaders and the populace at large must 
understand why it is the duty of the civilian leadership to be intimately involved in 
the arming, equipping, education and training of the armed forces in times of war 
and peace.19  It is crucial that the supremacy of civilian leadership be placed in 
the context of democratic politics.  A policy that is honed in the fires of 
democratic debate and disagreement is more resilient than one made with purely 
military concerns in mind.  Civilian leaders who are forced to justify policies to the 
electorate and to encompass a spectrum of concerns, not just security matters, 
will be eminently more qualified to make decisions than an expert in only defense 
matters.  “Civilian competence, in the general sense, extends even beyond their 
competence in a particular sense…Although the expert may understand the 
issue better, the expert is not in a position to determine the value the people will 
attach to different issue outcomes.  In the civil-military context, this means that 
the military may be best able to identify the threat and the appropriate response 
to that threat for a given level of risk, but only the civilian can set the appropriate 
level of risk for society.”20 
 
                                            
19 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 8. 
20 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question 
of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1996): 14. 
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3. Targeting the Professional Soldier’s Perception of Self and 
Politics 
 Military professionals who understand the true nature of democratic 
politics and democratic civil-military structures and procedures will be more 
politically astute, but paradoxically less likely to violate proper democratic values 
in the pursuit of their institution’s interests.  “All the available evidence underlines 
the conclusion that the officer’s sense of professional frustration increases as 
one moves down the military hierarchy.”21  It is surely no coincidence that junior 
officers fresh from officer training where the Huntington-inspired fiction of the 
apolitical officer is taught without reference to democratic politics feel a sense of 
frustration with politicians who they believe do not have the expertise to make 
judgments regarding security.   
 It is important for U.S. training programs in newly democratic states to 
stress the role of the soldier in politics in a democratic society so when problems 
arise between the professional military and democratically elected civilian 
leadership, as they surely will, they can be dealt with in the proper context. 
 Article 5 of the Law on Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina states that 
“the Armed Forces cannot be used for political purposes or political partisan 
activities.”22  It is a given that military forces should not be used for partisan 
political activities, but to expect the military to remain politically inactive is not 
realistic.  It is no surprise that this article appeared in the text of the Law on 
Defense in Bosnia and Herzegovina because for very practical purposes the 
strongest of stances had to be taken to ensure that the military was not engaging 
in partisan political activity.  The fact that the measure mentions political 
purposes as well as partisan activity buttresses the contention that the apolitical 
soldier myth is alive and well in newly democratic states. 
 The juridical prohibition against political activity will surely prove 
unenforceable in the long term because defense policy development and the 
                                            
21 Morris Janowitz, Professional Soldier (The Free Press: New York, 1960), 367. 
22 AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century – Defense Reform Commission 2005 
Report.  Sarajevo: n.p., September 2005. 
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competition for resources in which the military establishment will engage are 
inherently political in nature in a democratic society.23  “The military’s focus on 
equipping and training to win wars inevitably will conflict with the need for elected 
officials to serve the wider policies of the state.”24  In the most desirable of 
circumstances, military professionals will use levers of influence at their disposal 
to cajole civilian policymakers into acquiescing to their priorities.  In addition, “the 
military is involved in the political realm by influencing decisions made about the 
international balance of power and behavior of other states.”25   
 It must be stressed that this political activity is not partisan in nature at 
least by no means should it be.  “According to the definitions of military honor, 
the professional soldier is ‘above politics’…Under democratic theory, the ‘above 
politics’ formula requires that, in democratic politics, generals and admirals do 
not attach themselves to political parties or overtly display partisanship.  
Furthermore, military men are civil servants, so that elected leaders are assured 
of the military’s partisan neutrality.”26   
 4. Janowitzian Reality 
 This idea is hardly groundbreaking, for although the U.S. military surely 
stresses the ideal of the apolitical soldier in its training27 both domestically and 
overseas, the Janowitzian outlook has dominated the literature on the subject 
since the late 1950s.  There is even some evidence in The Soldier and the State 
that Huntington would have agreed with Janowitz’s assertion that professional 
                                            
23 Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier Citizen – The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997) 7.  “Like any bureaucratized state institution, the military 
seeks to maximize its political power and influence regardless of the political system in which it 
functions.” 
24 Thomas Durell Young, “Military Professionalism in a Democracy,” in Who Guards the 
Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas Bruneau and Scott 
Tollefson, (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2006), 23. 
25 Morris Janowitz, Professional Soldier (The Free Press: New York, 1960), 12. 
26 Ibid., 233. 
27 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question 
of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1996), 6. 
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militaries are political.  At times, their differences seem to lie in semantics.28  
Viewed through this spectrum, it is possible that Janowitz and Huntington were 
speaking past each other.  Whereas Huntington was speaking to actual military 
intervention in politics when the military oversteps its bounds by subverting the 
democratic institutions Janowitz sought to illuminate a more subtle view of the 
political spectrum and a professional military’s tendency to influence political 
decisions.29  
 The soldier exercises political skills in times of both peace and war.  In 
peaceful times, the professional soldier will aid in the formation of strategy and 
allocation of defense resources, including procurement and advisement of what 
is militarily possible with regard to civilian priorities.  During conflict, the soldier 
will aid the civilians in setting strategic priorities as well, but will also take a more 
active role in the prosecution of hostilities.  In both these cases, military 
professionals exercise political influence as an interest group. 
 On the strategic level, when military professionals clash with their civilian 
superiors about the proper course to take it does not signify a bad civilian-military 
relationship.  It can, in fact, be the best one can hope for.   
a. Professional Disagreement and the Inter-agency 
Process 
  The military chiefs in 1941 were recommending the concentration 
of forces in the Atlantic and limited provocation with Japan in anticipation of 
hostilities with Germany.  They were employing the military principle of 
                                            
28 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State – The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 88.  When discussing the influence of the 
officer corps, he discusses how “officers may develop inservice affiliations in the course of their 
military duties, as for example, special ties with congressional committees, or with those 
industries whose products are consumed by the armed forces.”  He later states that 
“These…factors will help give some index of the political influence of the military.”  Janowitz 
would say they were displaying political tendencies but Huntington uses the phrase “political 
influence.”  It is possible that Huntington understood the political nature of the military 
establishment and clearly meant “apolitical” to mean not engaging in partisan behavior. 
29 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
10. 
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“concentration of force” to the political realm,30 but Franklin Delano Roosevelt felt 
they were ignoring political realities.  “The military and civilian viewpoints were 
each correct from their individual perspectives.”  Roosevelt believed that a soft 
policy toward Japan was less risky than a hard policy and that provocation of 
Germany could have destroyed the domestic support for an anti-Axis policy.31  
Counter-factualism is popular.  Indeed, many say that Roosevelt’s judgment was 
flawed and that the Pearl Harbor attack was the result, but the important point is 
that Roosevelt considered the military aspect as represented by the JCS and 
made the decision based on all factors, not just those of the military situation.  
This is the best one can hope for. 
b. Unavoidably Political 
  If there is an exemplar of a professional soldier whose behavior 
displayed a healthy respect for democratic civil-military relations, it is General 
George C. Marshall.  He best represents the embodiment of loyalty to his civilian 
superiors, and is quoted as saying, “We are completely devoted, we are a 
member of the priesthood really, the sole purpose of which is to defend the 
republic.”32  Yet this is the same man who defied one of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
explicit orders in July 1942.  Marshall disagreed with Roosevelt’s veto of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff’s Pacific first strategy when Roosevelt ordered the JCS to agree to 
a North African landing.  Against Roosevelt’s intent, Marshall continued to pursue 
a de facto Pacific first strategy with limited success.33  This demonstrates that no 
military professional of high rank can avoid being sullied in the political arena.  
He believed a Pacific first strategy was the proper course in the defense of his 
nation, yet his instincts surely tugged at his conscience as he obliquely 
disobeyed his superior.   
                                            
30 Mark A. Stoller, Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. 
Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 62. 
31 Ibid., 62. 
32 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 205. 
33 Mark A. Stoller, Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. 
Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 87. 
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c. Inter-service Rivalry and a Competition for Resources 
  Politics practiced by the military very often take the shape of inter-
service rivalry manifested in recommendations to civilian superiors and leaks to 
the press concerning strategy and procurement.  These recommendations have 
real consequences in terms of allocation of resources and can potentially impact 
the successful defense of the nation.  Therefore, the can the military not possibly 
escape the realm of politics especially when these debates are made public? 
Prior to World War II the Navy argued for a larger presence in the 
Pacific, and by consequence favored more diplomatic pressure on Japan, which 
would therefore have political ramifications.  The Army favored a withdrawal from 
bases in the Pacific because of their remote nature and indefensibility.34  The 
Navy still believed in Alfred Mahan’s concept of national greatness and thought 
the Pacific was the future for American greatness.  “Any challenge to those 
concepts threatened not simply the navy’s strategy but also the very worldview, 
status, and jobs of its officers.”35  The Army’s opposition to these far flung bases 
rested on the realities of resource scarcity and a lack of national will.  The Army 
sought to avoid confrontation with Japan and a war that the American people 
would not support.36 
d.  The Advantages of a Politically Astute Military 
Professional 
  After December 7, 1941 many of the inter-service rivalries 
dissipated, but new disputes between the military chiefs and the civilian 
leadership became more intense.  As the chiefs argued their case they were 
exerting political influence and the country was better served by their savvy 
political skills.  After being told by Marshall his rationale for objecting to British 
strategy, Acheson concluded that “when Marshall thought about military 
                                            
34 Mark A. Stoller, Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. 
Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 6. 
35 Ibid., 7. 
36 Ibid., 6. 
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problems, ‘nonmilitary factors played a controlling part.’”37  Marshall had taken 
into consideration typically political factors such as public opinion.  This sort of 
calculus by the military will help it shape plans that are more realistic, therefore, it 
will be more likely to preserve harmony between the military and its civilian 
superiors. 
e.  Use of the Media 
  Often the military exerts influence on the political landscape 
through the media.  Senior British military officers have a long tradition of 
enlisting sympathetic journalists in their campaigns against civilian authority.  
Kitchener used his contacts38 to ensure his opinions appeared in the papers on 
the same day the Imperial Defence Committee would meet for confidential 
discussion.39  Wolseley had criticized Prime Minister Salisbury’s budget of the 
Army and Navy at a dinner and the remarks were later published in the 
Telegraph.40   
  Public military opposition to civilian policies also manifested itself in 
the United States Army prior to World War II.  Major General Embick advocated a 
continentalist military policy prior to World War II but his recommendations were 
rejected.  He then went public with his objections by associating with Frederick J. 
Libby’s National Council for the Prevention of War and by supporting the Ludlow 
Amendment.41   
  Up until the contentious war in Iraq, public stands by military 
officers on political matters may have appeared strange, but the influence was 
exerted nonetheless.  Reporters in the Washington, D.C., area have had contact 
                                            
37 Mark A. Stoller, Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. 
Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 270. 
38 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997),105.  Charles à Court Repington of the Standard has served with on Kitchener’s staff in 
Egypt. 
39 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
105. 
40 Ibid., 99. 
41 Mark A. Stoller, Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. 
Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 13. The Ludlow 
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with hundreds of professional military officers who were more than happy to offer 
their opinions, provide leaks, or report on policy proceedings.  These unnamed 
sources are merely following in Wolseley’s and Kitchener’s tradition.42 
  Recently, when several retired general officers called on the 
Secretary of Defense to resign, their aggressive use of the print and television 
media to push their agenda took the normally subtle use of the media to a new 
level for military professionals.  This has not been seen in the United States for at 
least a generation. 
5. Temptation for Blackmail 
 When a military professional’s star is especially bright, the playing field 
between the military professional and his civilian superior can become lopsided.  
In these cases, the temptation for blackmail43 can prove irresistible. 
a.  Kitchener in India (1902–1905) 
  When Lord Kitchener arrived in India to take up post as 
commander-in-chief he was determined to use his military prestige to dominate 
the political as well as the military realm.  He was even quoted as saying he 
intended to use his popularity to dominate the civilian leadership on the 
subcontinent.44  Kitchener bristled at the thought that his authority would be 
curtailed financially by a junior officer who an ordinary member of the Council of 
India when he was just an extraordinary member.45  This system had been 
recommended  by  the Hartington report46 in  the  spirit  of integrated control with  
                                            
42 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
99. “The Daily Telegraph had referred to Wolseley not by name but as the ‘highest military 
authority.’” 
43 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback – The Role of the Military in Politics (Pall Mall 
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44 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
104. 
45 Ibid., 104-5. 
46 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
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only the supply and finance of the Army outside of the commander-in-chief’s 
purview.  Kitchener wanted to consolidate these responsibilities into one man –
himself. 
  The conservative Balfour government in Britain was extremely 
vulnerable between the years 1903–1905 and could not afford a public break 
with the Hero of Omdurman,47 so he was able to blackmail the government in his 
battles with the Curzon, the Viceroy of India.  Once it became apparent that 
London would sooner acquiesce to Curzon’s departure than confront Kitchener, 
Curzon resigned and all military administration was consolidated under the 
commander-in-chief in India. 
b. MacArthur in Korea (1950–1951) 
  Gen. Douglas MacArthur famously blackmailed President Harry S. 
Truman during his prosecution of the war from Korea.  He took advantage of his 
prestige and constantly issued statements to the press in contradiction to 
Truman’s stated policies.  Truman was keen to limit the level of belligerency for 
geopolitical reasons but MacArthur wanted unrestricted warfare against the 
Chinese and was willing to use his prestige with the American people to achieve 
it.  Truman ultimately called MacArthur on his inappropriate behavior by firing 
him, but one cannot help but think that he would have been less confident and 
less willing to fire a national hero if the conflict between he and MacArthrur had 
occurred prior to 1948, before Truman had successfully run at the top of a 
presidential ticket. 
c. Powell and Clinton (1992–1993) 
  There was a famous meeting during the Bush–Clinton transition in 
November 199248 when Colin Powell voiced opposition to Clinton’s campaign 
promise to end the discrimination against gays in the military.  At the same 
meeting Powell made it quite clear that if at any time he felt he could not support 
                                            
47 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: The Free Press, 
1994), 283-285.  The battle of Omdurman took place in the Sudan during the re-conquest after 
General Charles Gordon’s demise at the hands of the Mahdi. 
48 Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 563-4. 
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the administration’s policies, he would “retire quietly, without making a fuss” as if 
the most popular Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since George Marshall 
could quietly retire early without political ramifications.  It was a polite shot over 
the bow for the new president-elect. 
  All presidents have their vulnerabilities, and Bill Clinton’s biggest 
one was his poor relationship with the military, one of the most powerful interest 
groups in Washington.  Bill Clinton’s susceptibility to blackmail was acute 
because of his lack of military service, his record of protesting the Vietnam War, 
and the prevalence of the “stab in the back” myth in American political culture 
regarding the failed military effort in Southeast Asia.  Additionally, Clinton and his 
aides likely believed Huntington’s estimation of a professional soldier.   
  The poor manner in which junior members of the White House staff 
treated senior military officers in the opening days of President Clinton’s 
administration has become the stuff of legend.  Their underestimation of the 
political nature of the professional military caused them initially to disregard 
courtesies vis-à-vis the military that a politician of Bill Clinton’s acumen would 
have been sure to treat other interests in the Beltway.  Clinton had failed to 
recognize the political nature of the military and had a dismal start in Washington 
because of it.  He was a quick study, however, and soon adopted more effective 
methods of dealing with the politics of the military.  Unfortunately, the damage 
had been done.  After his reversal of his pledge to end discrimination against 
gays in the military, he would be careful not to cross the Pentagon again for fear 
of political damage.  He had been effectively blackmailed on a wide range of 
issues, the least of which was the issue of gays in the military.  Through political 
pressure, the military had convinced its commander-in-chief that affairs within the 
military were, at least to some degree, outside of his purview.  
B.  GHOSTS OF MOLTKE THE ELDER 
1.  Introduction 
 Political activity by the military does not end with the initiation of hostilities 
so civilian leaders must resist popular sentiment that call for military experts to 
trump civilians who may not have a background in defense.  The strains that war 
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puts on society make the separation into spheres of influence difficult in any 
system, but most assuredly in democracies when constituencies will question 
resource allocation and strategy.  Such questions are raised because, in the 
prioritization of resources, there will surely be winners and losers.  Political 
pressure from the bottom up will be brought to bear through opinion polls and 
elections.    
 With regard to execution, the civilian leadership will be held responsible 
for failure or perceived misguided action by the military, so it is vital that they be 
intimately involved in military decisions made in times of both war and peace.  It 
is through this pluralistic process that civilian control gains its legitimacy and that 
the military’s actions are held in check by the populace.  This prevents the 
military from engaging in actions that society will not support in the long run and 
engages all of the populace in the choices that are made in its interest.  Politically 
savvy professional soldiers are better-equipped to deal with this process and 
political realities in the development of their recommendations to civilian 
authority. 
2.  The Unequal Dialogue 
 The idea that the civilians should “stay in their lane” with regard to military 
affairs is not a new one; it has been prevalent in military organizations throughout 
modern history.  Delineating responsibility between civilian political matters and 
military matters would be wonderful if possible.  It is not.  It is understandable that 
professional soldiers would want separation for clarity’s sake and it appears 
logical that civilians untrained in the art of war would be out of their element while 
trying to make decisions regarding military conflict.  It may seem logical, but it is 
incorrect. 
 In recent American history our bad experience in Vietnam and relatively 
good experience with the first Gulf War have helped to perpetuate a false myth 
that Colonel G. F. R. Henderson believed when he described Lincoln’s 
experience in the Civil War by praising “the virtues of independent military 
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command: unfettered control brought success, political subordination failure.”49  
This is not only a skewed version of Lincoln’s performance as a wartime leader,50 
but draws a conclusion that cannot stand up to scrutiny.   
3.  Tactics versus Strategy 
 It is axiomatic that war is political from beginning to end.  “Every war is 
begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; without a nation, 
without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm 
which furnishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there 
could be no army and no war.”51  Some of the most seemingly menial decisions 
have wide-ranging political implications during times of war and, therefore, are 
clearly the domain of the elected politician.  War is the politician’s responsibility 
and we cannot forget that when things go wrong, the politician will be the one to 
answer for it. 
 I am not just arguing that the civilian has the right to intervene in war; that 
is a given.  I believe he has an obligation to be thoroughly involved to gauge the 
wisdom of his subordinates and to remedy problems when they arise or direct 
how to avoid problems in the first place.  Sometimes generals do not see the 
forest from the trees and will equate tactics with strategy. 
a.  Bismarck-Moltke (1862–1871) 
  Moltke the Elder bristled at civilian interference with military affairs 
and sought to comprise a formula to neatly separate the political from the 
military.  His frustration was born of his encounters with Otto von Bismarck during 
hostilities against Schleswig-Holstein, Austria and France.  Known as the 
Bismarck-Moltke fights, they serve both as a good example of why soldiers long 
to be free of civilian interference during the prosecution of hostilities and as an 
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illuminating example of why they should not be.  I will look at just one of these 
disputes, the Düppel dispute, to illustrate how the political master was able to 
bring an entire spectrum of political considerations into his calculus, while the 
military professional was more limited in his considerations. 
  After the Prussian invasion of Denmark but before any decisive 
Prussian victories, the British proposed a peace conference in London to 
reconcile the belligerents.  Realizing that he needed an immediate impressive 
display of Prussian arms to dissuade involvement of the Great Powers in the 
conflict, Bismarck ordered the immediate storming of Düppel.  At the time, the 
Prussian military leadership was preparing for a long siege.  The military 
commander on site favored continued preparation saying that an immediate 
attack would, “cost a lot of men and money.  I don’t see the military necessity.”52  
Moltke, the chief of staff, backed up the commander on site.  After a month of 
Bismarck’s insistence, the attack proceeded and was a quick success.  The 
victory at Düppel “made it possible for Prussia to participate in the London 
conference as a power that had proved itself in the field…the French refused to 
entertain a British proposal for joint pressure on Prussia.”53 
  Moltke and the military commanders on site were viewing the 
dispute through their professional lens and clearly did not see the need for an 
immediate attack, but Bismarck was able to view the mosaic of political and 
military considerations and arrive at a different conclusion.  If a stunning 
vindication of Prussian arms had not been displayed, the possibility of French 
and British involvement in the conflict at Prussia’s expense would have increased 
significantly. 
  Whether Bismarck was correct in his calculus is not the important 
point to take away from the Düppel dispute, because there are other cases that 
can demonstrate poor civilian strategic judgment.  Principally we have to 
remember that if Bismarck was incorrect in his judgment, there would have been 
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dire political, social, economic as well as military consequences, the brunt of 
which would have been borne by Bismarck in his capacity as Minister President. 
b.  The Political Demands of Coalition Warfare 
  In a more expanded conflict such as World War II where total 
victory is the desired end state, these political considerations do not evaporate; 
they merely shift.  Instead of dissuading potential adversaries, the focal point of 
political maneuvering is to ensure domestic support and to build and maintain 
coalitions with allies.  Regarding trans-Atlantic convoys, Churchill found himself 
deciding minute, seemingly tactical problems54 because of their political nature.  
“The assumption of risk to Britain’s lifeline to the outer world required a political 
decision.”55 
  Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not work the politics prior to 
hostilities and then “turn over” the prosecution of the war to the military.  He was 
deeply involved in balancing the needs and concerns of the U.S. military against 
those of coalition partners to ensure the cohesion of effort against Germany and 
to a lesser extent against Japan.  Major military decisions that in Moltke’s view56 
should have been left to the military were adjudicated by FDR.  Grand Strategy 
required a daunting balancing act between keeping Russia in the war, logistical 
realities, manpower limitations, as well as military considerations.  To the 
layperson, whether or not to invade North Africa would seem to be a purely 
military decision based on capabilities and sound tactics.  In actuality, the  
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decision had to weigh suspicions57 and psychological estimations58 as well as 
capabilities and sound tactics. 
c.  Tactics and Strategy in Iraq 
  The competition between military concerns and political concerns 
has been on display in the conflict in Iraq and gives a present-day example of 
why political concerns necessarily have to trump tactical military concerns.  It is 
now conventional wisdom after the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004 
that the Marines should have been allowed to “finish the job” in April 2004 
because they ultimately had to take the city by force anyway; delay simply 
allowed the insurgents to further dig in and to prepare for the battle.  This is 
surely the vantage point of Marines who lost thirty-nine59 comrades in the failed 
April struggle only to return in November for the final assault.  Lt. Gen Conway 
best summed up this sentiment when he said. "Once you commit, you got to stay 
committed."60 
  This line of thought ignores the political developments of the 
summer of 2004 and of the inherent need for political progress during an 
insurgency where there can be no military solution, only a political one.  The fact 
remains that if we had “won” the battle for Fallujah in April but had lost the 
support of hesitant Iraqi political leaders that were working with the United 
States, it would have been a Pyrrhic victory and could have spelled the beginning 
of an ignominious withdrawal from a shattered country.  You do not have to “stay 
committed” if that is not what will meet your political goals.  All we did in Vietnam  
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was “stay committed” without questioning how the tactics would lead to strategic 
victory.  Contrary to popular belief there was too little civilian control in Vietnam, 
not too much.61 
  The summer of 2004 allowed the political landscape of Iraq to 
change drastically.  Insurgent attacks did increase but they contributed to a 
growing sense among Iraqis that they had had enough, especially since Iraqis 
themselves seemed to be the prime target of such attacks.  Prime Minister Iyad 
Allawi had taken over as caretaker of the provisional government and had a high-
profile role in calling for the second assault on Fallujah, decreasing the sense 
that Americans were merely avenging the deaths of American contractors at the 
expense of innocent Iraqis.  It appears that the political call to halt the April 
military assault on Fallujah due to Iraqi politicians’ reservations may have 
contributed significantly to the legitimization of Iraqi politicians which has proven 
vital to the series of elections since that time and have finally brought an elected 
government to power. 
d.  A Challenge to Civilian Control from Retired Generals 
  Since late March 2006 several recently retired generals have come 
out publicly calling for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  
Their reasons range from his treating the military with a “contemptuous” attitude 
to the assertion that he “set the conditions for Abu Ghraib” to the assertion that 
“we are fighting a 12- to 14-division…national strategy with something far less 
than that.”62  The highly unusual fact that so many retired generals have hit the 
talk show circuit and editorial pages across the country calling for the firing of the 
secretary of defense is something Americans should be concerned about, 
regardless of their political leanings. 
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  The value of their technical criticisms is not the issue.  The 
preservation of the military as a partisan-neutral organization is.63  Historically, it 
has not boded well for a country when military professionals have taken upon 
themselves to choose their civilian leadership.64  The general’s scope of concern 
is too limited, and in the case of the United States, the civilian leaders of the 
military are decided during our elections, not by the recently retired disaffected 
military leadership.   
  Each issue that was brought up by the retired officers was on the 
table for debate during the 2004 election and regardless of recent opinion polls, 
the electorate chose a Republican Congress and George W. Bush as their 
president during that election.  Although many of their criticisms regarding the 
prosecution of the war in Iraq may be valid, much evidence suggests that their 
true ire was aroused by Rumsfeld’s dedication to the transformation of the 





                                            
63 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Young Officers Join the Debate Over Rumsfeld.”  
Washington Post, April 22, 2006.  “Young Officers Join the Debate Over Rumsfeld.” Washington 
Post. April 22, 2006.  Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold’s statements in the article are of particular 
concern.  He said: “My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done 
with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to 
execute these missions – or bury the results.” This is a familiar attempt by military professionals 
to claim as theirs the exclusive role of security matters.  The implication being that only those that 
have been in the military or have served in combat are equipped to decide on security matters. 
64 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (New York: The Oxford University 
Press, 1955), 299-300. “[When the battles of 1914-1915] demonstrated that a definitive victory by 
Germany was unlikely…this brute fact forced the German government to consider the possibilities 
of ending the war…when Hindenburg and Ludendorff assumed leadership of the army in 1916, 
they did not hesitate to make their opposition [to negotiation] known…they were supported by 
powerful interest groups in the country.”  In the following years, the military leaders were able to 
create a ‘silent dictatorship’, destroying chancellorships at will.  They had effectively taken over 
the government because they convinced powerful interest groups in the country that they were 
more suited for wartime leadership than the civilian government. 
65 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: The Free Press, 2002).  Eliot Cohen 
released an updated version of Supreme Command in 2003 with an Afterword entitled 
“Rumsfeld’s War.”   
 26
discarded military advice throughout the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan 
and Iraq and believes that the retired generals are most upset by Rumsfeld’s 
“tough management style.”66 
  The most significant damage from this affair potentially will fall on 
the uniformed military and its reputation as a partisan-neutral organization.  Many 
pundits have posited that because the generals are retired, they are free to 
speak their minds and in fact that it is healthy that they do so because the free 
flow of information is vital to our society’s vitality and strength.67  This line of 
reasoning fails to understand the implications that such behavior has on the 
uniformed military as an institution when improper channels are used by senior 
individuals so closely associated with the military.  Their criticism of policy 
through appropriate channels is welcome and should be encouraged.  Publicly 
calling for the dislocation of their civilian leadership because they have deemed 
him unfit to serve is quite another. 
  We do not want to create a situation whereby policymakers start 
selecting military leaders based on their perceived political leanings.  Cynical 
observers may say that happens now, but real potential for abuse exists unless 
professional military officers demand discretion from their peers even after 
retirement.  
  As retired officers move into other professional endeavors, this 
becomes less of an issue.  Wesley Clark broke absolutely no standards of 
behavior by calling for the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld in spite of the fact that 
he is a retired general.  Since his retirement he has established his own bona 
fides separate from the uniformed military when he campaigned for political office 
and won democratic support for policies that he advocated.  Maj. Gen. (ret.) 
Batiste had barely taken off his medals when he started beating his chest about 
the resignation of the Secretary of Defense.  This is quite another matter 
                                            
66 Michael DeLong (Lt. Gen. (ret.), U.S.M.C.), interview with Matt Lauer, New York, April 17, 
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because his credibility is too closely tied to an institution that he claims to care for 
and because that institution could very well suffer the consequences of his 
actions far into the future.  
C. POST-COMMUNIST CHALLENGES 
1. Lack of Institutional Constraint 
 Theories about the political nature of professional soldiers are complex 
enough in consolidated democracies, so it should be no surprise that post-
communist societies in transition to democracy present an even more 
complicated dynamic.  The critical institutions external to the military68 that 
comprise a healthy democratic political system typically are absent or are in such 
a state of infancy as to limit their effectiveness.  The historical narrative of the 
state will also shape the perception of civil-military relations within officer ranks. 
 In Poland, “the fact that the Polish army was fully accessible to the Polish 
party apparatchiks and the Soviet military during the communist era created a 
strong institutional interest on the part of the Polish military to establish the 
widest possible autonomy from outside civilian control.  Senior Polish officers 
defined that quest for autonomy in terms of defending the army’s 
professionalism.”69  This was a dangerous but understandable tendency on the 
part of a military. 
 Education efforts within the militaries of these new democracies do not 
have the luxury of allowing their officers to believe in Huntington’s model of the 
apolitical soldier because the necessary institutions external to the military do not 
exist to constrain the political activity by the military.  Activity by the military 
pursued under the guise of “the national interest”70 is more dangerous when not 
recognized for what it is – political involvement. 
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they have some special and unique identification of the ‘national interest.’”  
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 The institutions and procedures that both employ and constrain the 
political activity by the military in consolidated democracies are transferable to 
these new democracies,71 but it will take time for them to become vibrant and will 
have to be advocated with a thorough understanding of the historical narrative of 
the target country in mind.  Professional norms must be adapted when officers 
trained within an authoritarian political system transfer their loyalty to a 
democracy.72   
2.  Institutional Development 
 Mouthing platitudes about civilian control without framing the reasoning 
within a broad spectrum of democratic institutions and procedures will not be 
effective.  Lessons learned about effective ministerial control, the free press, 
legislative control and executive authority can be demonstrated through historical 
analysis of experiences in the West as well as in the target countries.  “The goal 
of achieving democratic political control of the military can be advanced by 
focusing on specific aspects of the civil-military relationship”73 including the 
proper role of the military in the political realm and its relationship to the media,74 
the legislature and the population at large. 
 Andrew Michta argued that the civil-military relations in post-communist 
Eastern Europe have evolved into a distinct pattern, as a sort of transitory 
paradigm combining elements of praetorian militaries with some characteristics 
of professional militaries in consolidated democracies.75  He attributes much of 
this to the weak institutionalization of democratic political structures.  While the 
weak democratic structures exacerbated weak civilian control of the militaries, 
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73 Ibid., 3. 
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external pressures such as the desire to join NATO have moderated their 
tendency to achieve complete independence.76 
a.  Ministerial Control 
  Ministerial control is of prime importance.  The diffusion of military 
authority within the executive branch has been resisted in Western 
democracies,77 and Poland’s recent history underscores the vital need for 
ministerial control within a democracy.78  Primarily, it prevents the military from 
becoming the personal fief of the president or prime minister; but it also provides 
the legislature with a mechanism for more effective oversight.79 
b.  The Duties and Responsibilities of the Legislature 
  Legislative responsibility is also critical to the democratic civilian 
control of the military.  Within the government, the legislature is often the most 
susceptible to public opinion and combined with an open and free press are in 
the position to constrain and guide the direction toward which the military heads.  
“Democratic accountability is strengthened when policy making receives inputs 
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Although consultations with legislators may be more time-consuming than a 
policy process dominated by the executive, the end result is usually better (and 
longer-lasting) policy.”80 
If military professionals accept the assertion that the legislator will 
help craft a more effective and long-lasting policy, then it is surely in the military’s 
interest to participate in the debate.  Their cooperation with legislative staffs is as 
important as their advocacy to the population as a whole.  Professional militaries 
must keep a finger on the pulse of the population through effective interaction 
with the legislature. 
c.  The Military’s Relationship with a Democratic Society 
  The military must be sensitive to the reality that it must actively 
engage society in a healthy way.  Military leaders should understand that support 
for the military is contingent on support from society at large, and therefore skills 
they develop to deal with the press during good times and bad times are critical 
to their standing in society.  Militaries should welcome press interaction with their 
forces for many reasons.  First, through a skilled and coordinated plan, the 
military can show how the military is benefiting society in the way it socializes 
young men and through its civil-works projects.  Second, through appropriate 
information campaigns it can keep society informed of operations it is conducting 
throughout the country and overseas that help build its relationships with other 
democracies and economies.  Third, the press can serve as a conduit for 
information flow within the military itself, where, because of its hierarchical 
nature, information bottlenecks can isolate the top echelons of leadership from 
the noncoms and junior officers who are executing operations.81 
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D.  CONCLUSION 
 Misconceptions about the political nature of professional soldiers are 
widespread in both new and consolidated democracies.  In the very best of 
circumstances, professional militaries will compete with other actors in the 
democratic spectrum to advocate for their interests.  The limitation and control of 
this political behavior is one of the more critical problems faced by liberal 
democracies.  Janowitz and Huntington’s reliance on professionalism to 
constrain the military is surely not sufficient.82  
 One way to promote healthy democratic civil-military relations is to foster 
professional norms among the military leadership regarding inappropriate 
political activity.  If military officers understand their symbiotic relationship with 
the body politic, they will be less likely to circumvent the institutional restraints 
placed on their activity.    
 Most importantly, we have to look past the internal mechanism of the 
military establishment to the broader democratic institutions and procedures of 
the state for the answer.  Stressing these institutions and procedures in our 
efforts to consolidate newer democracies will go a long way toward achieving 
healthier civil-military relations and will lead to a more thorough understanding of 
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III. POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S 
ARMY 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
1.   The Basis of a Political Role and Legitimacy in Society 
 In communist Europe from 1945 until 1990, the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(YPA)83 retained a character that differed strongly from that of other communist 
armed forces.  There are several reasons for this, not the least of which is that 
the Yugoslav regime it served retained a character separate from the Soviet 
Union or any of its satellite states.  In addition to this fact, the Partisan struggle 
that the National Liberation Army (NLA)84 conducted against the Axis powers 
during World War II served as the founding instrument of communist 
Yugoslavia85 and the relationship between the Army and the Communist Party 
was centered on this common history.  This sense of identity “has mitigated 
institutional rivalry.”86 
 Unlike any of the other communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Josip Broz 
(Tito) and his men “had not ridden to power on the back of Soviet tanks and did 
not remain in power thanks to Soviet help.”87  This fact created a political 
dynamic involving the armed forces that was unique to Yugoslavia.  Political 
involvement by the military ebbed and flowed over the decades of Tito’s rule, but 
it always maintained a higher political profile than other communist militaries.  It 
can be said that after the Croatian Spring of 1971 no other European communist 
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military, except the Polish military regime that assumed power in 1981, played as 
integral part in political affairs as the YPA.88   
 This role was not always negative; in fact, throughout most of Yugoslavia’s 
existence after World War II the YPA’s political role was constitutional89 and it 
maintained a highly professional outlook regarding its proper place in society and 
served as a cohesive force in a country beset with ethnic tensions.90   
 The legitimacy of the YPA as an institution also ebbed and flowed over the 
years between 1945 and 1990 as political events transformed the shape of 
Yugoslavia’s institutions.  At times we will see the YPA’s relevance in society 
decrease and during times of regime insecurity it grew.91  
2.   Significant Events 1941–1990 
 Between 1941 and 1990 the YPA went through four major phases.  The 
first phase lasted from 1941 until the late 1950s and included the Partisan 
struggle during World War II and the Soviet-Yugoslav split.  This period was 
characterized by generally centralized control that focused on the defense of the 
state by a modern, conventional army.  The second phase lasted until the late 
60s and was characterized by a lessening of tensions with the Soviets and a 
refocus of the military on possible threats from the West.  The Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia ushered in the third phase which saw a decentralization of power 
away from the YPA to more diffuse republican military forces that would better 
counter a Soviet invasion through tactics perfected by the Partisans in World War 
II.  The fourth and last phase began in the early to middle 1970s as reforms were 
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enacted to draw power back toward the YPA in reaction to the nationalist 
Croatian Spring which posed the greatest threat to Yugoslav unity since the 
state’s founding in 1945.92  These changes occurred between 1972 and 1980.  
The result of these reforms was a federal government that was more 
decentralized to the republics, a military that was more centralized, and a link 
between the three entities that was confused and indefinite after the death of Tito 
in 1980. 
a.  First Phase 
  Tito and his Partisans prevailed in a bloody struggle in the Balkans 
between the Germans, Ustashas, two separate Chetnik movements and the 
Partisans.93  Tito masterfully played down his communist ideology in the fight 
against the Germans while the other movements steadfastly clung to their 
Serbian or Croatian blood claims.94 
  After the war, Yugoslavia naturally gravitated toward its ideological 
cousin, the Soviet Union, and “once the YPA had suppressed the remaining 
domestic opposition to communist rule, it became preoccupied with external 
security.”95  Soon, Tito found a reason to adopt a more hostile stance toward his 
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former patrons96 when “Western support for anti-communist forces in the Greek 
civil war was said to be a manifestation of the ‘imperialist threat.’”97 
  Tito soon developed a suspicion of Stalin’s intentions, however, 
and began to resent what he felt was Stalin’s desire to exploit Yugoslavia 
economically.98  He finally opposed Stalin publicly over the independence of the 
YPA from Soviet control in 1947.99  By late spring of 1948, the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was expelled from the Cominform.  Soon 
Western aid would flow back into Tito’s coffers as Yugoslavia dealt with isolation 
from the Soviets and their allies.100 
b.  Second Phase 
  By the late 1950s, Tito’s Yugoslavia slowly began to relax from its 
fear of a Soviet invasion.  The power between the republics and the federation 
shifted slightly toward the republics as they gained concessions from the army in 
matters such as the basing of some troops in their home republics.101  Military  
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ties with the Soviet Union resumed and Yugoslavia increasingly began to see 
larger threats from the West, especially in light of events such as the 1967 Middle 
East war.102 
c.  Third Phase 
  The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army changed 
Yugoslavia’s outlook as well as the organization of its army.  The ease with which 
the Soviet army had so easily penetrated a small, weaker nation caused the 
Yugoslavs to reconsider its underlying strategy regarding the defense of the 
nation.  “The principal military lesson of the brutal crushing of the Prague Spring 
of 1968 was that a relatively small country such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia 
could not realistically expect to defeat a Soviet invasion force in direct battle and 
using static tactical doctrines, given Soviet superiority in troop numbers, and 
quantity and quality of equipment, and given the strategic advantage of the 
element of surprise that accrues to any aggressive attacking force.”103 
  The result was the development of the Territorial Defense Force 
(TDF) in 1968.  This new republican-based force was meant to supplement the 
YPA in the event of foreign invasion.  The new force would mobilize as the YPA 
slowed the initial invasion, then it would revert to an intense in-depth defense 
with the YPA only to turn to familiar guerilla tactics as an act of last resort.104  
The upshot of this change would be a diffusion of power from the YPA to the 
republics, as the TDF units would be responsible to republican civilian authorities 
and would only fall under YPA command when they were involved in joint 
operations.105  In many ways, this defense policy was in harmony with the self-
management socialism philosophy that had sown discord between Stalin and 
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Tito in the first place;106 it was very much in line with the trend of the mid to late 
1960s of increasing republican control of matters across the spectrum of 
government. 
  The relaxation of secret police controls that accompanied the fall of 
a Serb head of the state security apparatus in 1966 was followed by a general 
rise in nationalism across Yugoslavia in the following years.107  In Croatia, the 
first threatening incident to the unity of Yugoslavia occurred in 1967 when “a 
group of Croatian writers published a declaration asserting that Croatian was a 
distinct language from Serbian.  The implication was that Serbo-Croatian and 
attempts to harmonize the languages were really attempts at Serbanizing it.”108  
The ensuing rise in Croatian nationalism came to be known as the Croatian 
Spring and lasted from 1967 until 1972, but reached its apex in 1971 with the 
development of a mass nationalist movement that was regarded as the most 
serious domestic challenge to Tito’s regime in the entire post-war period.109  The 
Croatian Communist Party (LCC) was involved in the movement initially to gain 
economic advantages for Croatia, but soon nationalist organizations began to 
flourish in the more liberal environment and began to make separatist demands 
including membership in the United Nations.110   
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Tito vacillated initially,111 but eventually decided that the only thing 
that could hold the country together was the suppression of the nationalist 
movement.  Most observers believe that the YPA is the institution that eventually 
pushed Tito to act.  “The army did not intervene openly, but it seems to have 
been active behind the scenes.”  Tito’s subsequent statements indicate that the 
army had filled the vacuum left by the party’s inability to act.112  Tito’s concept of 
the role of the military in domestic affairs was clearly being shaped by the 
instability that nationalism had brought to his regime when he stated that “the 
[a]rmy played an internal political role…as well as one of external security and 
would be utilized to suppress a challenge to the integrity of the Yugoslav state if 
events dictated it.113 
d.  Fourth Phase 
  The Croatian Spring disturbances increased the power of the YPA 
because they indicated to Tito the need for greater military participation in 
domestic affairs.114  Several reforms were enacted immediately following the 
suppression of Croat nationalism in 1972, but an even greater number of reforms 
were enshrined in the new constitution of 1974.  Not all these reforms drew 
power from the republics to the federal government.  In fact, many favored 
greater latitude for republics in specific areas, but attempted to strengthen the 
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unity of the party.115  Institutions were established that were designed to would 
take over for Tito after his death.  One such institution that would take over Tito’s 
death was the new federal presidency.  It was a collective leadership 
institution116 and it consisted of one representative from each of the six republics 
and of two autonomous regions, with the chairmanship of the presidency rotating 
to each member on a yearly basis.117 
  Tito also began the process of centralizing the control of the TDF, 
which was finally completed in 1980 with the establishment of the Council for 
Territorial Defense in 1980.  Article II of the 1974 National Defense Law still 
stated that the TDF was decentralized, but the establishment of the CTD made 
the TDF a component of the YPA itself, thus completing the centralization.118 
  In the 1980s, a marked change occurred in the level of military 
involvement in domestic affairs.  Prior to this, YPA members had become more 
numerically important in domestic politics, but the ambitions of individual military 
professionals were less clear.  They had previously been seen as a generally 
conservative influence on the government and besides that had confined 
themselves to military technical tasks.  In the 1980s, “the management of the 
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economy, social order and the political system increasingly became topics of the 
generals’ critical attention.”119 
  This development owed much to the fact that so many generals 
had been appointed to positions in the 1970s that traditionally were held by 
civilians within the party organization.120  This increased the vacuum left by Tito 
after his death.  It created an environment whereby the successors to Tito’s 
tradition of Yugoslav unity would feel it natural to fill the void.121 
  While there was no doubt that the party was superior to the armed 
forces, the statutory mandate for this premise was muddled at best and was 
often quite contradictory.  When Tito died in 1980, the post of commander-in-
chief died with him.  The role should have transferred to the federal presidency, 
but articles in the constitution contradict, obscuring who is ultimately 
commanding the armed forces.  Article 20 of the 1974 National Defense Law 
states: 
 
  “The supreme commander of the armed forces can transfer the 
execution of  definite actions of commanding and leading the armed forces to the 
federal secretary for national defense.” 
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  In close contradiction, “Section A of Article 105 of the National 
Defense Law states that the federation, or the federal government in Belgrade, 
‘shall organize and prepare the Yugoslav People’s Army and shall lead and 
command it.’”122 
  Ambiguities such as these are not uncommon in statutes, but very 
little effort was made in the 1980s to actually establish statutory party control 
over the YPA; after Tito’s death, the federal presidency held only nominal control 
over the YPA, leaving the real power in the hands of the federal secretary for 
national defense.123  The dysfunctional structure of the federal presidency lent 
itself to this outcome.  Given the nature and structure of the federal government, 
this may not have been altogether a bad thing.  By all accounts the YPA served 
as a positive and unifying force in the uncertain 1980s when the country’s 
compass was so badly affected by the loss of its charismatic leader.  “The YPA 
act[ed] as a restraining and disciplining device against the worst excesses…of 
the powerful and centrifugal nationalist forces so evident in Yugoslavia in 
the…1980s.”124   
  In the end, however, the ineffective nature of the federal 
presidency, a bad economy, and designs by nationalist demagogues conspired 
to create a crisis for the Yugoslav state that would ultimately prove its undoing. 
3.  Ethnic Tensions in Society and Its Impact on the YPA 
a.  Introduction 
  The Balkans have the unfortunate distinction of being the cross 
roads between Christian and Muslim Europe as well as Eastern and Western 
Christianity.  “[T]he modern line between the Latin alphabet and the Roman 
church in the West, and, in the East, the Cyrillic script and the Orthodox church 
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corresponds to the old line separating the Roman from the Byzantine Empire”125 
and it runs directly through the former Yugoslavia.126  This and the fact that the 
Ottomans have contested this portion of Europe since the 14th century ensured 
an almost perpetual state of religious and ethnic turmoil.127  Even though the 
Ottomans no longer posed a serious threat to Christian Europe after 1699, 
northern Bosnia and Serbia were trading hands between the Ottomans and the 
Habsburgs as late as the early 18th Century.128  
  In more modern times the Balkan Slavs struggled to gain their 
independence and establish their own state.  Of all the southern Slavs, the 
Croats and Serbs have proved the most formidable of the ethnic groupings and 
have quarreled for dominance of the Balkans.129  In the 20th century, the 
Serbians gained the upper hand with the establishment of a constitutional 
monarchy after World War I which was based on a Serbian monarchy, though 
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technically named “The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.”130  When 
faced with Nazi threats, the monarchy capitulated and was overthrown by 
outraged Serb officers.  During the struggle against the Nazis, only the Partisan 
movement was able to appeal to all southern Slavs because of its pan-nationalist 
message.131 
b.  An Acknowledged Problem 
  The Yugoslav People’s Army has struggled throughout its history to 
deal with the ethnic problems associated with the recruitment and training of an 
army in such an ethnically diverse country with such deep historic ethnic divides.  
Nationalism has been called the Achilles Heel132 of the YPA and the army’s 
leadership has taken steps over the years to deal with the problem because they 
understood that questions of ethnic composition cut directly to the issue of the 
legitimacy of the army across Yugoslavia’s ethnic lines.  “[It recognized] the 
crucial symbolic importance for the functioning of the Yugoslav political system of 
respect for national affirmation within the YPA.”133 
  The YPA has tried to maintain an officer corps composed 
proportionally of the various nations and nationalities.134  The plan has not been 
successful because of the lack of appeal of army life in certain sectors.135  Many 
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Croats and Slovenes had other employment prospects that appealed to them 
more than a prospective career in the military.136  This is natural, as Slovenia and 
Croatia were the most productive regions of the country.  There has been 
success at diversity efforts at the High Command level,137 but the lower echelons 
of the officer corps is still dominated by Serb officers.138   
c.  A Pan-Yugoslav Organization?  
  The army has always prided itself on the pan-Yugoslav nature of its 
organization.  Its history as a successful resistance movement against the Nazis, 
Ustashe and Chetniks owes much to the fact that it celebrated the histories of all 
South Slavs.  Tito himself is the product of a mixed marriage.139 
  During his lifetime Tito had always helped paper over the enmity 
and differences between the varied ethnic groups in Yugoslavia.  The 
governmental institutions he left in place to take over after his death were too 
dysfunctional to take on the unifying responsibilities that Tito himself had 
undertaken.  The YPA saw itself as the heir to this role, but there are serious 
questions of legitimacy when an army endeavors to fill such a role in a 
government that surely belongs with the civil authorities.140  Additionally, 
structural problems exist at the federal level that would prevent the army from 
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wielding enough influence among the eight representatives on the federal 
presidency to achieve adequate unity.141 
B.   IMPACT OF EVENTS AND ETHNICITY ON CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
1.  Introduction 
 It is important to remember while studying the civil-military relations of the 
former Yugoslav state that it possessed an entirely different dynamic than do our 
familiar democratic institutions today.  In spite of the fact that Yugoslavian politics 
and civil-military relations were more complex at times than most other 
communist societies,142 it by no means possessed the symbiotic relationship that 
exists in democratic countries between policymakers (comprising of the 
executive and legislature), the public, the press and the military.  At times, civil-
military tensions did manifest themselves, but prior to Tito’s death these tensions 
were derived from interest groups trying to sway the decisions of one man: Tito.   
 After Tito’s death we saw the federal Yugoslav government was in 
disarray while it grappled with changing federal and republican roles.  It is useful, 
however, to examine the impact that events over the lifespan of the Yugoslav 
state had on civil-military relations so that we may derive lessons by observing 
the cultural and societal tensions that exist in a Balkan multi-cultural society.  The 
military in Bosnia today deals with many of the same issues that the Yugoslav 
People’s Army dealt with because it is composed of three major ethnic groups 
and they share old historical tensions as well as the fresh wounds of the recent 
conflict in the 1990s. 
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2.  1941–1967 
 Between 1945 and the mid 1960s, the YPA largely concerned itself with 
what is generally thought of as professional military competencies.143  The 
relative tranquility and prosperity that Yugoslavia experienced during the 1950s 
and the dominating leader that Tito embodied left little room for the military to 
play a large part in what was thought of as domestic affairs.  The regime’s 
legitimacy was inextricably tied to the NLA’s performance against the Nazis in 
World War II and the YPA was the heir to that tradition.  Because of this 
intertwined sense of identity between the Party and the YPA, institutional rivalries 
were thwarted.144   
 The power of the secret political intelligence service or State Security 
Administration (UDBa)145 overshadowed the power of the YPA and in fact much 
of its activities were directed toward the YPA immediately after the split with the 
Soviet Union when many high ranking members of the YPA were exposed as 
Soviet agents.146 
 One direct result of the break with the Soviets was the abolishment of the 
political commissars in military units.  Although there had been commissars in the 
NLA, the concept was borrowed from the Soviets.147  Their role was 
strengthened during the search for Cominformists within the military, but the 
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commissars were abolished at the Sixth Party Conference in 1953.  The political 
organs of the YPA were now subordinated to commanders up and down the 
military hierarchy. 148 
 Tensions with the Soviets cooled in the 1950s and the military lost stature 
and resources because of a general feeling of security.149  By 1968, “Yugoslavia 
devoted less than 6 percent of [its] national income to defense and the YPA had 
been reduced to nearly 200,000 men.”  One upshot of this loss of influence within 
society was the active opposition to party policies by some retired officers.150 
 Greater autonomy for the republics encouraged what would be unheard of 
anywhere else in the communist world: the YPA’s budget was questioned.151  
The slow-down in economic prosperity and a competition for resources among 
the republics spawned debate about how much defense was necessary and how 
that money could be better spent elsewhere.  This was quite common in the 
West, but was not seen anywhere else in communist Eastern Europe.  Even 
though this period of questioning military budgets for guns in favor of butter for 
the betterment of the society would not last long, it bodes well for the future of 
Bosnia that such a tradition does exist in the polities comprising the former 
Yugoslav state.  The lowering of barriers between the military and society is an 
important step in the consolidation of democratic institutions.  That the Yugoslavs 
have already experienced this pressure could go a long way toward meaningful 
democratic change in Bosnia with regard to control of the military if ethnic 
differences can be overcome.152 
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3.  1967–1990 
 Against the military’s wishes, the entire foundation of the Yugoslav 
defense structure was changed in the wake of the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.  These changes reduced the YPA to the status of co-equal with 
the parallel structures of the TDF that were commanded at the republican 
level.153  The rise of nationalistic sentiment and the diffusion of military authority 
to the republics combined to make this period of time the nadir of the YPA’s 
political involvement and influence. 
 The Croatian Spring marked a sea change in the domestic role of the 
military and also eventually caused the transformation of the military structure of 
the country back to a centralized structure that had only recently devolved to the 
republics.  “Since the events of the Croatian crisis there has been a continuous 
military input into the political system of Yugoslavia.”154  It is clear that the events 
in Croatia that culminated in 1971 gave Tito serious pause regarding the extent 
to which he was willing to devolve military power to the republics, fearing the 
establishment of republican armies.155  This did not prevent the continued 
empowerment of the republics in other areas, such as the rotating presidency, 
but seemed to indicate that Tito felt increasingly comfortable with giving the YPA 
a more prominent role in order to head off the dismemberment of the state. 
 To this end, the YPA was given a litany of posts within the federal 
government that previously had been held by civilians within the party structure.  
It is here that we see the line between civilian roles and military roles grossly 
violated.  Up until this time, there had been some level of constraint put on the 
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military regarding its de jure involvement in domestic affairs.  With the 
appointment of several senior generals to civilian posts, this is no longer the 
case.   
 The army did not just gain positions of power within the domestic 
governmental structure in the 1970s, but it also gained influence in the party 
itself.  So at a time when the party was purging nationalist members and re-
establishing control over governmental structures throughout Yugoslavia,156 the 
military was consolidating its position within the party.157  It is interesting that this 
transformation of the military’s role in domestic politics was done through 
constitutional means.  “[T]he YPA has…become involved in domestic Party-
political life, not on its own initiative but at the insistence of Party leaders and Tito 
himself.”158  “Whilst constitutional order prevail[ed], the YPA’s legitimacy as a 
political actor [was] intact.”159  In this sense, the YPA’s domestic political activity 
was a legitimate role, but this in no way means that it was altogether a good idea.  
This role was consolidated in the 1980s and we will see that it set the stage for 
confusion during the crisis of the early 1990s.   
 The YPA was unequipped institutionally to deal with the events that led to 
the break-up of Yugoslavia.  The complete lack of authority that defined the 
federal presidency combined with nationalist politicians in almost every republic 
scrambling to be the first to the ramparts in the defense of their bloodline created 
an almost unsalvageable situation for the YPA to deal with.  That being said, the 
YPA at times stood its ground against nationalist politicians when they were 
clearly violating the law.  Additionally, we will see that some among the army 
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leadership were prescient enough to see that the YPA would have to abandon its 
loyalty to the party in the interest of bringing Yugoslavia into the new post-
communist world intact.160  
C. KADIJEVIĆ– A CASE STUDY IN PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILIAN 
CONTROL 
1.  Introduction 
 General Veljko Kadijević served as the federal secretary for national 
defense (defense minister) from 1988 to 1992.  Previously, he was the protégé to 
Admiral Branko Mamula, who was the defense minister during the 1980s and 
who had taken de jure control of the military after Tito’s death.161  Kadijević was 
of mixed Croat and Serb lineage.  He is often blamed for the maelstrom that 
engulfed Croatia and Bosnia after the short war with Slovenia in 1991,162 but 
upon closer examination we see a man who was simply unable to envision the 
best way to proceed to preserve the constitution and Yugoslavia itself during a 
confusing and unprecedented time.  He was clearly unequipped to counter the 
demagoguery cloaked in legal arguments put forward by nationalist politicians 
such as Slobodan Milosević.  
 By the end of the 1980s, there was a serious lack of support for the 
Yugoslav regime and it manifested itself in a lack of commitment to a united 
Yugoslavia all across the country.  This was mostly due to economic tensions 
between the republics because of the grave economic crisis that was engulfing 
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the country.163  In Slovenia, the Communist Party of Slovenia found itself aligned 
with the radical youth movement against the YPA in 1988 because of a 
controversial court martial conducted against a Slovene member of the YPA who 
had leaked information to a local nationalist publication.164 
 This event set off a series of events that drove a wedge between the 
leadership of Slovenia and Slobodan Milosević, who was the president of Serbia.  
It is important to note that at this time the federal presidency was split between 
those aligned with and those opposing Milosević and his specious constitutional 
claims. 
2.  Federal or Serbian Authority? 
a.  Slovenia’s Secession 
  Prior to the ten-day “Phony War” against Slovenia the YPA 
struggled to defend the Yugoslav republic from the forces of nationalism.165  
Although evidence exists that the leadership of the YPA had Serbian leanings, 
they valued the multi-ethnic and federal nature of the YPA.  The YPA was not 
privy to Milosević’s plans for the destruction of Yugoslavia;166 they regarded 
themselves as guardians of the constitution and the federal nature of Yugoslavia. 
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  The army’s desire to prevent the destruction of Yugoslavia and to 
adhere to its constitutional obligations were clearly in conflict with one another as 
force was contemplated against the errant republic of Slovenia.  Milosević had 
urged Kadijević to use force against Slovenia to purge the leadership and to 
prevent them from proposing constitutional changes to allow for more republican 
authority.  Kadijević’s vacillation at using force against Slovenia in the autumn of 
1989 saved Slovenia from a crackdown resembling that which had taken place in 
Kosovo and Vojvodina earlier that year.  He was constrained by the rule of law 
regarding the use of force by the Yugoslav People’s Army and the need for it to 
be sanctioned by appropriate authorities in the federation.  The Slovenes owe 
their successful separation from the federation to Kadijević’s critical decision in 
September of 1989 not to intervene with the military in a Kosovo style 
crackdown. 
  In September 1989 Slovenia sought to check the growing 
dominance of Belgrade within the federation by instituting constitutional 
amendments of its own.167  Slovenia’s leaders were alarmed at Serbia’s 
treatment of the previously independent regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina and 
feared the three of eight votes on the federal presidency that Belgrade controlled 
as a result.  Slovenia sought to shift a myriad of responsibilities for Slovenia’s 
affairs from the federation to the Republic of Slovenia.  This very open challenge 
to the federal prerogatives of the central government set the stage for Kadijević’s 
critical decision not to send the YPA into Ljubljana. 
  Borisav Jović, who was Serbia’s representative to the federal 
presidency, Milosević, and Kadijević decided that it would be sufficient to 
threaten to impose a state of emergency on Slovenia.  When that did not 
dissuade the Slovenes from proceeding with their plans, they turned to the 
federal constitutional court to rule on whether or not the amendments to 
Slovenia’s constitution would violate the federal constitution.  Chief Justice Ivan 
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Kristan, a Slovene, argued that the court could not rule on hypothetical 
legislation, and the majority of the judges backed his decision.168 
  At this point it became clear that only the army could keep 
Yugoslavia from dissolving.  If the federal government no longer retained the 
ability to collect taxes, to redistribute funds, to authorize army deployments or to 
authorize a state of emergency then the federal republic would be completely 
unable to enforce its decisions.   
  Jović and Milosević turned to Kadijević to authorize the army to 
step in.  At this most critical time, Kadijević did not cave to pressure from the 
Serbian officials to intervene.  This was critical because in this early stage of 
Slovenia’s separation from Belgrade the Slovenes had made few preparations to 
counter a military crackdown and a determined intervention by the army would 
have surely been successful and at a relatively low cost.  Instead, because of 
Kadijević’s professional concerns about using the YPA in such a way, Slovenia 
had bought some time to make critical military preparations as well as political 
headway with the other republics, specifically with Croatia.  At the next meeting 
of the Central Committee, Croatia would back Slovenia for the first time in its 
efforts to devolve power to the republics. 
  Almost two years later Belgrade would pull the rug out from under 
the military during the Ten Day War by withdrawing support for the YPA to hold 
Yugoslavia together.   
  In those two years Milosević made a conversion from the pursuit of 
a Belgrade-dominated Yugoslavia to the pursuit of a Greater Serbia.  Milosević 
would deny Kadijević’s goal to implement Plan B which would have authorized a 
full-scale invasion and the crushing of the Slovene rebellion.  Ironically, it was 
Kadijević who prevented the military from enforcing Belgrade’s will in 1989, and 
                                            
168 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), 
75. 
 55
now that Belgrade’s intentions had shifted, it was Belgrade that prevented the 
military from enforcing the preservation of Yugoslavia in 1991.169 
  After the ten-day “Phony War,” the YPA’s metamorphosis into a 
Serbian army was accelerated.  The YPA’s mask of defending Yugoslavia was 
removed the day the army withdrew from Slovenia.170  No longer would 
constitutional limitations and legal precedent for action play into the calculus of 
those at the helm of the YPA.  The YPA encouraged Croatian, Slovenian, 
Muslim, and Macedonian officers to leave and in this way ensured the transition 
of the YPA into a Serbian army.  This development meant that the army’s leaders 
were increasingly of Serbian heritage.171  In the ensuing conflicts with Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, YPA assets would be put to much more dubious use 
than was ever contemplated against Slovenia.  This transformation into a Serbian 
army is one of the most critical reasons for the outrageous behavior of the YPA 
after its short war with Slovenia.  The gloves had come off and military 
professionals such as Kadijević could find no cover from Serbian nationalists 
both in an out of the military.   
b.  Kadijević, the Role Model 
  It is clear that Kadijević opposed many of Milosević’s more 
egregious goals and at times showed a reluctance to see Milosević prosper.172  
He refused to use the army in 1989 against Slovenia because the federal 
presidency had not authorized it.  Even his own personal desire to prevent the 
weakening of the federation did not cause him to bend to Milosević’s desires.   
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  The shift in attitude that occurred when Kadijević took over as 
minister of defense is striking.  As trouble was brewing in Slovenia in the wake of 
the controversial trial, he announced that the army publication Narodna Armija 
would be published in the other official Yugoslav languages – Macedonian and 
Slovenian.173  This action showed a level of political sophistication and was in 
stark contrast to the hard line adopted by his predecessor.  
  In 1987, Marco Milivojević predicted that the YPA would break with 
the Communist Party if it felt it was in the interest of maintaining the Yugoslav 
federation.174  Seeing the unfolding events in the early 1990s, Kadijević showed 
rare political prescience with some of his statements regarding the future status 
of the party and its relationship to the army.  He said that “although the 
Communist Party had played a major role in forming the army’s pan-Yugoslav 
character, especially through the LC-YPA, with the demise of Communism, 
political organization within the party was no longer tenable.”175  With this he 
gave the first signs of his wish to depoliticize the YPA.  
c.  Kadijević & Political Blunders 
  Although Kadijević displayed some astute behavior during the crisis 
of the early 1990s, his blunders were significant and adversely affected the 
YPA’s professed goal of preserving the federation.  His inappropriate dabbling in 
partisan politics only fueled fears among republican forces across Yugoslavia 
about the intentions of the Serbian nationalists and YPA. 
  The biggest mistake Kadijević made was the endorsement of a new 
political party that undermined the efforts of the federal prime minister, Ante 
Marković, who was putting together economic reforms designed to align 
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Yugoslavia with the world’s new post-Cold War realities.  The new party was 
called the League of Communist-Movement for Yugoslavia (LC-MY) and 
reasserted communist ideals, as well as the pan-Yugoslav ideals.  Although the 
party was intended to keep Yugoslavia together, these actions by the acting 
defense minister only served to solidify feelings in the republics that the military 
had a reinvigorated political profile.176 
  Kadijević would continue to work against Marković even though 
Marković was the only significant figure in the federal presidency who was 
working for the preservation of the federation.  Marković in the end was a tragic 
figure because he alone had worked to treat Yugoslavia as sick with the cancer 
of nationalism while others fed that same cancer.  He resigned on December 20, 
1991 with the war in Croatia and the impending war in Bosnia a direct result of 
his failures.177  Kadijević at this point had been working against him for more 
than a year.  Kadijević’s dedication to communism had help doom his federation 
and his army. 
  Kadijević was clearly outside of his area of expertise while 
endorsing communism through his support of the new communist party.  
Because the viability of the Yugoslav state was fundamentally dependent on its 
economic viability, the military establishment should have been prepared to 
subjugate their needs to the general welfare of the state.178 These decisions can 
only be competently made by the civilian leadership.  Although Marković was not 
democratically elected, it was clearly within his prevue to look after the economic, 
social and military welfare of his state.  Kadijević’s prevue should have been 
much more limited. 
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3.  Conclusion 
 General Kadijević was in the unenviable role of Defense Minister of a state 
that was heading toward a catastrophe because of its dysfunctional federal 
structure and nationalists leaders at both the federal and republican levels that 
were bent on the destruction of the state. 
 Kadijević displayed promising signs of restraint at times and in doing so 
surely prevented unnecessary deaths in Slovenia.  He was overcome by events.  
Once he saw that the destruction of the Yugoslav state as he knew it was 
inevitable, he was unable to counter the actions of nationalists throughout 
Yugoslavia.  He clearly lacked the political skills necessary to prevent the 
compromise of YPA men and material to the nationalist designs of Milosević and 
ex-military leaders such as Admiral Mamula. 
 His ill-fated forays into partisan politics such as his endorsement of the 
LC-MY only accelerated the destruction of Yugoslavia by helping to de-legitimate 
Ante Marković, who was the only man who had the backing of Western sources 
of capital through the enactment of reforms that would help rescue Yugoslavia 
from financial ruin.  By actively opposing the Prime Minister, Kadijević unwittingly 
helped Milosević and other nationalist such as Franjo Tudjman in Croatia pull 
Yugoslavia apart at the seams.  Kadijević was not prepared for partisan politics 
and he should have refrained from acting in that vain.  Depoliticization and 
withdrawal from the political realm would have better served Marković, the YPA, 
and the Yugoslav state.179 
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IV. CONTEMPORARY BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
A.  FROM DAYTON TO THE DEFENSE REFORM COMMISSION OF 2005 
1.  Introduction 
 The Dayton Accords were signed in December 1995180 and established 
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a federation, composed of two “entities”: 
the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.  An 
international administrator called the High Representative of the United Nations 
was established to oversee the transition to a peaceful and legitimate state.  The 
entire agreement was enforced by the Implementation Force (IFOR), which was 
eventually replaced by a Stabilization Force (SFOR).  In 2004 SFOR turned over 
its responsibilities to a European Force (EUFOR).181 
 The Dayton agreements and their implementation have been an 
unmitigated success.  The international soldiers have not suffered any casualties 
to hostile fire since 1995 and they have succeeded in separating the two hostile 
camps, thereby preventing any further loss of life.  The problem with Dayton is 
that it calcified a governmental structure that could not be sustained over the long 
term and it had no provisions for the creation of a viable federal government that 
could administer the entire country.  Because of this structural flaw, the 
International Commission on the Balkans, after it reviewed the political situation 
in the Balkans in April of 2005, that “The region is as close to failure as it is too 
success.”182 
 The need for military reform became more urgent as it became clear that 
the entity governments were unable to control the assets of their own militaries 
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being used for nefarious purposes183 and as the aspirations of the Bosnian 
people began to shift toward integration with Europe and NATO.  In order to 
qualify for the Partnership for Peace184 and full membership in NATO, serious 
defense reform had to be initiated to bring the armed forces under better civilian 
control and to consolidate the entity armies under federal control. 
 A Defense Reform Commission was formed in 2003 with the task of 
reviewing possible avenues for reform.  Their suggestions were crafted into law 
and passed all parliamentary procedures in the spring of 2004.  A new round of 
reforms were launched at the insistence of the High Representative after a series 
of intransigent maneuvers by members of the various entity governments and 
militaries to resist implementation of reform measures and after it was discovered 
that members of the military were aiding individuals wanted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).185 
 The Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report urged the further 
consolidation of military authority under the federal government of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.186  It also proposed a litany of other reforms to facilitate the 
country’s acceptance into NATO’s Partnership for Peace with the ultimate goal 
being full accession into NATO.  These reforms were all passed by the various 
parliaments and the entity ministries of defense were abolished on January 1, 
2006. 
2.  The Dayton Accords 
 The Dayton peace agreement ended a brutal three-and-one-half year civil 
war that pitted the Bosniaks (Muslim) and Croats living within the boundaries of 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Bosnian Serbs.  The agreement successfully 
established the peace, but was considerably less successful at creating a viable 
state in the conflict’s aftermath.  Dayton created two entities, the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation (Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the Republika Srpska.  The 
federal government’s powers were kept weak, with most governing functions 
being maintained at the entity level.187 
 The agreement itself consisted of eleven Articles and twelve Annexes that 
covered the separation of the warring parties, the demarcation of agreed borders, 
and a constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, among other items.188  The entities 
were separated by an Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) that, once established, 
resembled an international border complete with check points and changing 
script on road signs as a traveler passes from one entity to the other.189 
 “The accord created 13 overlapping constitutions (for the 10 cantons of 
the Muslim-Croat federation, two entities and the central government), as well as 
reams of laws and regulations that have made the country a bureaucratic 
nightmare.”190  At the federal level, it created a prime minister, a Council of 
Ministers, a bicameral state Parliament and a three-member presidency.  As 
dysfunctional as the tripartite presidency is, negotiators at Dayton had to fight 
with the leaders of the three warring factions to pare it down from their 
expectations of nine to seven presidents.191 
 Most observers agree that Dayton was a great achievement in that it 
ended the war and laid the foundation for consolidating the peace but that since 
the document was derived from war-time circumstances, it cannot ensure 
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Bosnia’s future as a democratic state.192  Over the past year, the United States 
has joined the growing chorus of international actors urging for the modernization 
of the Dayton Accords.193 
3.  Security Sector Reform 
 Richard Holbrooke thought the biggest flaw in the Dayton Peace Accords 
was that it permitted the existence of two opposing armies in one country but 
also recognized that an alternative option to this flawed structure did not exist in 
1995.194  Although a significant reduction in forces did take place in the late 
1990s, from 2000–2003 the armed forces of the separate entities still used up a 
significant portion of GDP and they continued to focus on threats from the other 
entity’s military.195 
 Since 2003 Bosnia-Herzegovina has been undergoing security sector 
reform with the cooperation of the international community and it has proved to 
be extremely successful.  It has come in two phases.  The first Defense Reform 
Commission in 2003 recommended several steps toward the consolidation of 
authority at the federal level, and the entity parliaments approved the plan to 
move operational authority to the federal level.196 
 In December 2004 the UN High Representative Paddy Ashdown called a 
press conference stating that Bosnia-Herzegovina has failed to meet its 
obligations because of actions by the Republika Srpska.  The harboring of war 
criminals such as Ratko Mladic was sighted as the most egregious example, but 
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he also noted other roadblocks the Republika Srpska was erecting to stifle the 
reform necessary for European and NATO integration.197  He recommended that 
NATO not consider Bosnia-Herzegovina for PfP participation until they fully 
cooperated with the ICTY and he also called for a more comprehensive round of 
defense reforms. 
 The members of the Defense Reform Commission of 2005 comprised 
members of the entity governments, the Bosnian federal government and 
members of the international community.  Participation and “buy in” by Bosnian 
politicians at all levels was critical to ensure that a change in governments would 
not put the reforms in jeopardy.  This “buy in” also fostered a more resilient 
reform because anything imposed by the international community would surely 
not have been politically sustainable within Bosnia-Herzegovina.198 
 Their recommendations stressed the need for the creation of a single 
defense establishment and a single force in Bosnia and Herzegovina under a 
fully functioning state-level command structure, as well as the restructuring of the 
Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet the defense needs of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  Specifically, this meant developing capabilities that would 
enhance their ability to participate in collective security with international bodies 
such as NATO. 
 The abolition of “entity” defense organizations in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as well as the Republika Srpska would require imaginative 
structural creativity in order to integrate forces previously aligned against each 
other into an effective military force whose capabilities would not only enable 
participation in NATO but would also reflect the values necessary to meet basic 
NATO requirements. 
 The Defense Reform Commission recommended the development of a 
professional service that was drastically smaller than that of the former entity 
defense organizations, reducing the forces from approximately 60,000 personnel 
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to 10,000 personnel.  The abolition of a wholly inadequate conscription system 
that bled valuable resources from the state’s coffers while contributing little to the 
defense needs of the state was seen as a critical step to professionalizing the 
force.  Increasing its capabilities was vital to making them a more valuable 
member of the greater European defense structure that stressed collective 
defense over border security. 
 One of the more ingenious structural changes recommended by the 
Defense Reform Commission was the adoption of a brigade-based system for 
the operational chain of command while instituting a regimental system for purely 
ceremonial and military heritage purposes.199  A total of nine operational infantry 
battalions would comprise three multi-ethnic brigades with each brigade being 
composed of one battalion from each regiment.  The regiments would continue to 
foster pride in military heritage of their respective ethnic group by maintaining a 
purely ceremonial office dedicated to that regiment and staffed by five or six 
personnel for these purposes.  The regiment would have no operational or 
administrative authority.  They would merely provide the basis of esprit de corps, 
moral and unit cohesion by preserving and developing military heritage and 
identity. 
 All operational command would be exercised by the multi-ethnic brigade.  
This arrangement would have the additional benefit of integrating well into 
NATO’s brigade-based deployment practices.  Just as the brigade is the basic 
formation of NATO armies, so shall it be for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.   
 Because the entity defense organizations would have to be abolished, the 
Defense Reform Commission recommended two chains of command, an 
operational and an administrative to culminate with the presidency of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  An Operational Command and a Support Command were  
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recommended.  Both of these commands would report to the chief of the Joint 
Staff who would report to the minister of defense who would report to the 
presidency.   
The Commission recommended severing the political link between the 
appointment of the minister of defense and general officers in senior command 
positions.  General officers would instead be appointed by the presidency which 
was less susceptible to the volatility of parliamentary politics.  This 
recommendation attempted to put a larger barrier between politicians and 
general officers in charge of operational units.  This way a change in the minister 
of defense would not affect the tenure of senior military officials. 
 Lastly, the commission requires that both the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Republika Serpska pass legislation abolishing their 
respective entity defense organizations and transfer all authority to the ministry of 
defense for Bosnia and Herzegovina, ensuring that they harmonize their 
respective laws to comply with the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  For instance, 
both the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Serpska had to 
amend laws on civil protection and laws on pension and disability insurance to 
comply with provisions in the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
concerning these matters.  The entities were given six months (after January 
2006) to comply with this harmonization.200 
 The Defense Reform Commission’s 2005 Report was published in 
September 2005.  The entity parliaments passed the necessary legislation during 
the fall and early winter.  On January 1, 2006 the first stage of consolidation took 
place as the entity ministries of defense were abolished. 
B.  INSTITUTION BUILDING 
1.  The EU and NATO – Do They Facilitate Democratic Reform? 
 In NATO in the New Europe, Alexandra Gheciu makes the argument that 
NATO facilitates the establishment of democratic governments by helping to 
establish a habitus of democratic norms that helps to consolidate these new 
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democracies through democratic institution building.  She argues that although 
NATO is a supra-national organization, it is able to influence the internal debate 
in these countries as they struggle to reform their structures and practices to gain 
acceptance into PfP or NATO.  “Far from acting as a mere geostrategic 
arrangement, NATO has been involved in a broad set of activities aimed at 
promoting the construction of a kind of liberal state identity in Central and 
Eastern Europe.”201 
 In “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy,” Dan Reiter 
argues that NATO does not help spread democracy and that the geopolitical 
risks involved with utilizing a military alliance such as NATO in this way poses 
more risk than potential reward.  He points to the fact that some NATO members 
flipped between democracy and autocracy during the Cold War and that former 
communist nations have successfully pursued democratic reform without regard 
to prospective NATO membership since the Cold War has ended.202 
 NATO did make ideological concessions at times during the Cold War, but 
much of this can be ascribed to making a tactical concession on ideological 
grounds in order to more firmly secure the strategic high ground for the collective 
democracies in the alliance.203  Additionally, it is flawed logic to assume that 
because nations have successfully pursued democratic reforms without NATO’s 
influence that NATO’s influence was not constructive in nations that did receive 
NATO’s help and guidance. 
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2.  Institution Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina poses a much more difficult developmental problem 
than many of the other nations in Eastern or Central Europe.  In addition to the 
litany of social and structural shifts involved in a transition from a communist 
system to that of a democratic and capitalistic society, Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
the added dimension of having recently fought a brutal civil war.  The scars left 
on the people in the country from such a recent ethnic conflict makes reform 
efforts much more difficult to enact and implement. 
 In the defense sector, the United States, EU, NATO, and the OSCE have 
been involved in reform efforts since 1996 and have achieved a higher degree of 
success than in political reform and consolidation.204  The carrot of accession 
into NATO or PfP has proved to be the driving force behind the successful reform 
efforts in the defense sector.205 
a.  General Officer’s Seminar 
The Center for Civil Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California, ran a three-part seminar between September 
2005 and April 2006 for all thirteen Bosnian general officers, as well as several 
senior prospective general officers from the ranks of the brigadiers (NATO 
Grade: OF-5).  The senior members of the staff were U.S. Army Gen (ret.) 
William Crouch206 and U.K Army Maj. Gen. (ret.) Drewienkiewicz.207  They have 
both been heavily involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina since 
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1996 and are well known by all the major actors in Bosnia.  Also among the staff 
were several retired U.S. colonels and academics with a varied skill sets who 
were serving as instructors for subjects ranging from ethics to public relations.208 
Each period of instruction emphasized important aspects of 
professionalism in a democracy and stressed the importance of executing the 
policy directives of their civilian leadership.  Gen. Crouch would interject from 
time to time during the instruction to make important points regarding civil-military 
relations at the most senior level.209  During Col. Tomasovic’s instruction on the 
elements of national power, Gen. Crouch stressed the need for senior military 
leadership to anticipate political goals set by political leaders in the execution of 
their military duties.210   
This underscores the need for the Bosnian military leadership to 
develop political and communication skills to better keep their parliamentarians 
and leadership in the executive branch better informed. 
Col. Lee Hockman stressed the need for the military to establish an 
effective public relations campaign.  In addition, he stressed the role of the media 
in a democracy and its critical role in the symbiotic relationship between the 
military and the population as a whole in a democracy.  Lastly he stressed 
effective techniques for dealing with crisis situations. 
At the conclusion of Col. Hockman’s lesson, Lt. Gen. Podžić made 
very clear to the generals in his charge that since the minister of Defense has 
forbidden any public statements by members of the military to the press there 
were to be no public relations efforts made. 
                                            
208 The seminar staff and their area of instruction: Col. (ret.) Bob Tomasovic, USA  – 
National Elements of Power (D.I.M.E.); Col. (ret.) Ed McCarthy, USA  – Team Building and Group 
Dynamics; Col. (ret.) Tom Norton, USA; Col. (ret.) Lee Hockman, USA – Public Relations 
(Media). 
209 Gen. Crouch is especially qualified to make these observations regarding the nexus of 
senior military professionals and their civilian superiors because Gen. Crouch finished his career 
in the U.S. Army as its 27th Vice Chief of Staff. 
210 Gen. Crouch said that because political leaders control the resources, the generals had 
to ensure that the legislature and their other elected leaders understand their needs.  Also, he 
stressed the importance of being completely forthcoming to their political masters saying, “If I 
keep them in the dark and then I need their support, I will be in a tight position.  If I communicate 
well, then it can help me.” 
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3.  The Importance of Civilian Education in Security Sector 
Reform 
 A real dichotomy exists today in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The uniformed 
military has gone through several years of indoctrination and training in the realm 
of democratic civil-military relations and their institutional structures should 
closely mirror those of Western democracies throughout Europe after the 
Defense Reform Commission’s recommendations have been implemented.  The 
level of development of the mid-level bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense and 
the Parliament leaves much to be desired and would greatly benefit from a 
concerted effort like that which has been so successful on the uniformed military 
side. 
It is clear from the discussions held at the general officer’s seminars that 
the military’s senior leadership has a good measure of sophistication with regard 
to democratic civil-military relations.  Moreover, senior officials from Western 
European nations are convinced that the defense reform measures taken 
recently to integrate the entity militaries will endure because the senior uniformed 
military genuinely want them to.  They are convinced that the way forward is with 
NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Community and they understand that the alliance is 
a community of values even more than one of arms.211  Where their development 
seems to have fallen short, at least relative to other areas, is in the manner in 
which they relate to and interact with the society at large.   
a.  Parliament and the Ministry of Defense 
The appropriate channel for interaction with society for the senior 
leadership of the military is through the Parliament and through appropriate 
communication of policy to the press.212  Unfortunately, there is a very low level 
of bureaucratic sophistication in both the Ministry of Defense and the 
                                            
211 John Drewienkiewicz (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.K. Army), interview by author, Monterey, Calif., 
May 23, 2006 and William Crouch (Gen. (ret.), U.S. Army), interview by author, Monterey, Calif.., 
25 May 2006. 
212 It is important to stress, just as Col. Lee Hockman stressed during his period of 
instruction on the media, that the military must communicate policy initiatives as directed by their 
civilian superiors.  The military has an obligation to interact intimately with both the Parliament 
and their superiors in the executive branch. 
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Parliament213 in large part due to the fact that there has not been the level of 
international attention and resources devoted to it as there has been toward the 
uniformed military.  This is not a sustainable condition because healthy 
democratic civil-military relations are dependent on an assertive, ethical, and 
knowledgeable civilian participation in security affairs at both the Parliament and 
Ministry of Defense.  Without the appropriate training, incompetent or overly 
politicized staff could cause an unhealthy dynamic between the Parliament and 
the military or the Ministry of Defense and the military.214 
b.  The Press and Media Relations 
  The press in Bosnia-Herzegovina bears many of the same 
institutional challenges as the government in its adaptation to post-communist 
realities.  The civil war added an additional barrier to fair and accurate reporting.  
Since everything in Bosnia-Herzegovina is demarcated according to ethnic 
principles, the demarcation applies also to the press.215  There is very little 
reporting of serious issues216 and there is little understanding among the 
members of the press of their critical role in a democratic society to serve as both 
a conduit for information and as a safeguard against abuses by the 
government.217 
                                            
213 Senior Department of Defense official, interview by author, Washington, D.C., January 
26, 2006.  He attributed this to no training for lower Ministry of Defense personnel and that IMET 
funds were focused on military personnel.  In addition, Bosnia’s economy is in such poor shape 
that many of the talented personnel are employed by NGO’s because their wages are so much 
more generous than government jobs.  “The women that swab the floors are often lawyers.” 
214 One senior Bosnian general told me that the level of training of mid-level civilians at the 
Ministry of Defense and the Parliament was one of his greatest concerns because he felt they 
were not familiar with their appropriate role in a democratic society.  This senior general stressed 
that the Minister of Defense was most certainly his superior, but that overly partisan underlings 
within the department would abuse their authority at times. 
215 Topic, Tanja. Victory of the Boulevard, 4. Found at: http://soemz.euv-frankfurt-
o.de/mediaee/qpress/articles/pdf/ttopic.pdf#search='victory%20on%20the%20boulevard%20tanja
%20topic  
216 Ibid., 11. “Little money is set aside for serious work, the approach is poor, bar-room 
stories become serious newspaper headings with no research at all.” 
217 Lee Hockman (Col (ret.), Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army), interview by author, email, 
May 9, 2006. 
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  In this environment, the Ministry of Defense and the uniformed 
military are especially vulnerable to the manipulation of their statements by 
partisan forces within the press and society at large because there is little to no 
investigation or verification done.  Given these conditions, it is especially 
important for the civilians within the Ministry of Defense and the uniformed 
military as an institution be well prepared to present an accurate picture to the 
public of how their forces are being trained, equipped and led.218  At the very 
least senior commanders should have training that will equip them to deal with 
the media during crisis events.  
  As the one truly ethnically integrated institution in Bosnia-
Herzegovina today, the military is in a unique position to serve as an example as 
a functioning and effective multi-ethnic institution.  The possibilities are infinite for 
press releases that stress the multi-ethnic nature of their organization in its day-
to-day operations.  It is true that these news items will at times be cherry-picked 
by nationalists on all sides to highlight special treatment or disadvantage in this 
or that instance,219 but this should not dissuade the government from slowly 
building on the good news coming out of the Ministry of Defense. 
  The health of the military as an institution is inextricably linked to 
the health of the federal government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its ability to 
successfully remove the distrust and rancor caused by the civil war in the 1990s.  
It is in the government’s interest to educate the civilians in the Ministry of 
Defense and the uniformed military on how to get those messages out so that all 
parties will then feel comfortable with their participation in the national 
                                            
218 Lee Hockman (Col (ret.), Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army), interview by author, email, 
May 9, 2006.  Speaking about his period of instruction on media affairs during the January 
general officer’s seminar, Col. Hockman said, “I was talking about defending the integrity of the 
institution in a developing political/social realm were public officials, including military, were now 
accountable to the electorate for their performance and use of national resources.” 
219 One example of partisan use of what should have been a good news story about 
integration is the pillorying of Lt. Gen. Podzic, who is Muslim, in the Bosniak (Muslim) press when 
he attended the Republika Srpska’s Army Day ceremonies in January.  He attended the 
ceremonies in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the recently integrated Armed 
Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but was attacked by many Muslims for doing so.  After the event, 
his daughter was even harassed by university staff in Sarajevo where she attends law school. 
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dialogue.220  Highly developed political skills will be important in this endeavor, 
and their maturation will no doubt take time, but with new attention given to 
media training for both civilians and the military, a positive force for integration 
can be given a new profile in the fractured society.221 
C.  WITHER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT? 
1.  Introduction 
 There has been significant progress made recently toward the integration 
of the entity governments and the reform of the federal system in Bosnia.  In 
January 2005, Suleman Tihac, the Bosniak representative on the tri-member 
Presidency, boasted that constitutional reforms designed to “affirm Bosnian-
Herzegovinian identity” were underway and that he hoped the reforms would kick 
off a round of reforms leading to a new constitution in 2010.  Leaders of the 
country’s constituent people have agreed to work to “dismantle the tri-presidency 
in favor of a single head of state, while boosting the powers of Bosnia’s prime 
minister and parliamentary speaker.”222  The leaders of Bosnia’s Serb community 
stated publicly their unequivocal commitment to the capture, arrest, and transfer 
of Mladic and Karadzic to The Hague.223  Many believe that the tide has turned 
irrevocably toward reform and integration.224 
 Positive events such as these, as well as the successful security sector 
reform efforts, have made the abolishment of the office of the High 
                                            
220 It is especially important to break the military of the communist-era mentality that, as one 
senior U.S. Department of Defense official put it, “everything military is secret.” 
221 In Lt. Gen. Podžić’s closing comments at a seminar for Bosnia’s general officers on 
January 25, 2006, regarding press relations, “in a divided society it is important to tread lightly.  
For the transition, I think it is good that we sit tight…this doesn’t mean that it will not change.” 
222 Eric Jansson, “Stability eludes Bosnia 10 years after Dayton,” Financial Times, 21 
January 2006. 
 
223 Conoleezza Rice, (speech, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., November 22, 
2005).  
224 Nicolas Burns (Assistant Secretary of State), interview by Robert Siegel, 21 November 
2005. “Now they’ve had 10 years of peace.  They’ve been able to reflect on the fact that the 
bigger ambition now has to be ethnic reconciliation…I think most Bosnians are focused on that.  
They just want to live a normal life, after having gone through that horrible war.” 
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Representative a possibility in the very near future.225  Currently it is scheduled 
to be abolished in October of 2005 after the elections, but realistically the Office 
of the High Representative will stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina until the summer of 
2007226 and will most likely retain his Bonn Powers until that time. 
 The Bonn Powers that the High Representative has wielded since 1997227 
have proved critical to jump-starting stalled progress,228 but many have accused 
the High Representative of stymieing local political development by imposing 
change in such an authoritarian manner without local mandates.  Regardless, 
most agree that it is time for the Bosnians to move “from Dayton to Brussels” and 
for the Europeans to influence reform through a representative from the 
European Union’s headquarters instead of through an internal executive authority 
premised on the Dayton Accords.229 
2.  Discretion is the Better Part of Valor 
 The progress toward political integration and transparency has often 
consisted of two steps forward, one step back.  The police reform measures that 
the Bosnian Serbs agreed to pursue last fall are now stalled due to obstacles 
                                            
225 Julie Kim, “Bosnia: Overview of Issues Ten Years After Dayton,” Congressional 
Research Report for Congress (CRS Order Code RS22324), 6. 
226 John Drewienkiewicz (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.K. Army), interview by author, Monterey, Calif., 
May 23, 2006. “He has said that he will give up the Bonn Powers after the government is formed 
after the elections in the autumn.  In reality, look for him to give those powers up in about a year.” 
227 Julie Kim, “Bosnia: Overview of Issues Ten Years After Dayton,” Congressional Research 
Report for Congress (CRS Order Code RS22324), 5.  At the Peace Implementation Council 
meeting in Bonn in December of 1997, the council extended the High Representative’s mandate 
to include imposing laws and removing officials. 
228 “Ashdown – British Marine Who Led Bosnia with an Iron Fist,” Agence France Presse, 
December 14, 2005.  In June 2004, Ashdown sacked sixty Bosnian Serb officials including the 
president of the main nationalist Serb Democratic Party and interior minister over suspicions they 
were part of [a] support network of war crimes suspects at large…And earlier this year, he sacked 
a Croat member of the presidency, Dragan Covic, due to corruption charges brought against him 
by the Bosnian state prosecutor.” 
229 “Bosnia Reaching Turning Point with EU Move,” Agence France Presse, October 20, 
2005.  Speaking about the abolishment of the Office of the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown 
said “this will mark the end point of the era of Dayton and the beginning of the era of Brussels.” 
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thrown up to block the crucial police reform.230  On April 26, 2006, Bosnia’s 
Parliament failed to ratify constitutional changes that would be needed in order to 
joint the EU.231 
 The efforts at political reform are going to be a divisive time in Bosnia 
when powerful interests in both entities will see their power base erode if reform 
succeeds.  Politicians will see their fiefdoms lose power to the federal 
government, and nationalists232 will see their illegal and lucrative rackets under 
scrutiny from a newly empowered federal police authority.  Because of this, 
political reform will be infinitely more difficult and time consuming than security 
sector reform and it will require the continued deep involvement of the 
international community.  There are valuable lessons, however, that the 
international community and reform-minded Bosnians can learn from the 
successful rounds of defense reform. 
a.  Consistency and Unity of Effort 
  Maj. Gen. Drewienkiewicz of the Defense Reform Commission 
credits consistency and international unity of effort for the success of the security 
sector reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.233  Pressure and resources should be 
applied in concert by the United States and the EU for governmental reforms and 
a serious education campaign should be embarked upon along with these 
reforms in much the same way that security sector reform was conducted in 
tandem with educational initiatives.  The U.S. should let the EU take the lead on 
this, while at the same time providing the appropriate assets to aid in its success.  
The United States and the EU should meet periodically to update priorities and 
                                            
230 “Updates from the Balkans,” email from Leadership Development and Education for 
Sustained Peace, May 31, 2006. “High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling criticized 
Republika Srpska authorities on May 26 for raising a new obstacle to the crucial police 
reform…They disagree with the draft model of the BiH police forces…which would transfer 
legislative and budgeting responsibilities in the police sector from the entities to the state.” 
231 “Please Let Us Join Your Club,” The Economist, May 4th, 2006. 
232 Holbrooke, Richard (Former Assistant Secretary of State), interview by Neil Conan, 
November 21, 2005. “It is the thuggish leaders, many of whom are just plain old Mafioso crooks 
masquerading as nationalists who prevent [reform].” 
233 John Drewienkiewicz, “BiH Security Sector Reform.” (n.p., May 2006). 
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set their agenda, but then the EU’s representative to the Bosnian government 
should be able to negotiate with full authority on behalf of the Euro-Atlantic 
community.   
  This arrangement makes sense for several reasons.  First, because 
the Defense Reform Commission was able to set priorities in training, it greatly 
contributed to the success of the entire endeavor.  During the defense reform 
efforts, a cacophony of programs were offered from countries all over Europe; 
but the commission prioritized them and turned many down.234  No such 
authority exists today in governmental reform and education.  Currently there are 
in excess of forty-five different programs being pushed by Western governments 
with no overriding authority to set priorities and goals.235  Second, a consistent 
and unified international effort will be able to most effectively apply pressure to 
the Bosnian government to get serious about greater governmental reform.  The 
EU has a significant carrot to offer in prospective EU membership.  Through 
appropriate coordination with the United States, the EU could also be given the 
additional asset of a significant stick to use against the Bosnians if they resist 
appropriate governmental reforms.  The United States could use its significant 
resource allocation to apply this pressure when the EU’s representative feels it is 
necessary. 
  The United States should accept this approach because the EU 
has as much of an interest in serious governmental reforms and, more 
importantly, the EU’s priorities so closely mirror those of the United States with 
regard to governmental reform.  The United States would still maintain bi-lateral 
ties to the military and the Bosnian government as a whole, but it should be 
made clear that regarding governmental reform, the EU has the lead.  It should  
 
 
                                            
234 James Locher (Chairman, Defense Reform Commission), interview by author, Monterey, 
Calif., June 5, 2006. 
235 John Drewienkiewicz (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.K. Army), interview by author, Monterey, Calif., 
May 23, 2006. 
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be made clear that any intransigence on the Bosnian government’s part with 
regard to the EU’s priorities may also cause certain resources from the United 
States to dry up as well. 
b.  A Role for NATO and the United States 
  Recently, Montenegro has voted to secede from Serbia proper, and 
the Balkans are bracing for the possible independence of Kosovo in the very 
near future.  The prime minister of the Bosnian Serbs has warned that if Kosovo 
is granted independence it could cause trouble in the Republika Srpska.236  Maj. 
Gen. David Leakey, commander of the 7,000-strong European Union military 
force in Bosnia, has stated that without a sustained military presence in the 
Balkans, “a cocktail of destabilizing factors could unlock instability.”237   
With so many destabilizing events occurring in the next few years 
and while Bosnia also tries to undertake drastic reform measures, the EU and 
NATO should not rush to withdraw troops.  NATO’s continued presence is vital 
because Bosnian officials often cite the critical role of U.S. leadership in 
eventually bringing an end to the Bosnian war in 1995, especially in the wake of 
failed U.N. peacekeeping missions, which were composed largely of European 
forces.238 
  The EU should continue to provide stabilization forces while the 
limited NATO presence continues to serve as a reassuring factor.  The presence 
of a general officer from the United States who serves in an advisory capacity on 
defense reform and other matters goes a long way to assure the Bosnian 
government that the United States remains committed to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
success. 
   
                                            
236 “Updates from the Balkans,” email from Leadership Development and Education for 
Sustained Peace, May 16, 2006. 
237 “Stability Eludes Bosnia,” Financial Times, January 21, 2006. 
238 Julie Kim, “Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO 
Peacekeeping,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (CRS Report Order 
CodeRS21774), 6.  The NATO force in Bosnia is extremely small and is comprised of 
approximately 220 U.S. Army personnel and is commanded by a brigadier general. 
 77
V. CONCLUSION 
A.  DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE POLITICAL 
SOLDIER 
1.  Primary Question 
 This thesis questioned the United States and NATO’s education efforts in 
nascent democratic states and the portrayal of the ideal professional soldier’s 
political involvement in the process.  The question here arose because of 
observed confusion within our own society regarding the political involvement of 
our professional military.  The fundamental misunderstanding that exists in 
American society regarding the proper roles of military professionals and their 
civilian superiors caused me to question the methods we use to educate 
professional military personnel in newly democratic states on the proper role of 
soldiers in a democracy. 
 The question is an important one because if the estimation of the 
professional military’s political involvement is not accurate then a democracies’ 
ability to check the ambitions and power of our uniformed military will be put in 
jeopardy.  It is easy for a respected military officer to play power politics and 
claim an apolitical stance because of his status as a non-partisan patriotic 
servant of the people, all the while advocating positions that are highly political 
and controversial.  In developing states this danger is more acute because of the 
underdeveloped nature of its democratic institutions, norms and practices. 
 I had expected to find that our training was focused too heavily on 
Huntington’s model of the apolitical soldier, but I did not.  Instead this study found 
that the Bosnian military officers displayed a thorough academic understanding 
of where the military fit into a democratic society to include its role in bureaucratic 
politics.   
 Their understanding was only academic, however; in practice, the Bosnian 
military is incapable of interacting with society in a healthy way.  This is due to 
the lack of development of civil society and of the democratic institutions outside 
of the security sector.  Without a more vibrant press that is less ethno-centric and 
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a more professional bureaucracy in the ministry of defense and the parliament, 
the military cannot effectively communicate and interact with Bosnian society as 
a whole in the way that a professional military should interact in a democracy.  
Without these conduits, the military cannot effectively communicate its 
professional opinions, and the parliament cannot exercise true oversight. 
 The efforts of the Defense Reform Commissions have been extremely 
successful at consolidating the entity militaries under federal control, and at 
establishing effective security sector structures.  The Parliament has oversight 
authority, but its ability to effectively exercise oversight is hampered by its lack of 
qualified mid-level bureaucrats and a dysfunctional press that cannot perform its 
investigative and informational roles so critical in a democracy. 
B.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Unity of Effort 
 The international community and reform-minded Bosnians should emulate 
aspects of the successful security sector reform efforts in their attempts at 
political reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Political reform will prove to be a much 
more difficult process because those who stand to lose power as authority 
passes to federal authorities will employ nationalist demagoguery in their 
attempts to block it.   
Security sector reform was not an easy process, but has been an 
undeniable success.  Consistency and unity of effort proved invaluable in the 
security sector reform efforts.  For political reform to stand a chance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the international community must stay committed to democratic 
institution building while Bosnia moves “from Dayton to Brussels.” 
The United States and the European Union should consolidate its efforts 
at governmental reform and the United States should let the EU take the lead.  
Bi-lateral contacts will still thrive between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United 
States, but in the area of political reform the United States should make it clear 
that the EU represents our position.  Our goals for political reform closely mirror 
the EU’s and the EU has a fundamental interest in successful reform if it is to 
allow Bosnia-Herzegovina to join its membership.  Multiple international 
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programs and goals would make political reform even more difficult than it has to 
be.  If Bosnian officials understand that U.S. resources and EU resources will dry 
up if genuine efforts at reform are not made, it will empower reform-minded 
Bosnian politicians in their political battles with nationalist and organized crime 
bosses interested in preserving the status quo. 
2.  Bureaucratic Education 
Education efforts with the uniformed military have been extremely 
successful.  These efforts have to be extended to the civilian staffs of the ministry 
of defense and the parliament.  The military will be unable to interact with society 
properly until an assertive, competent and ethical civil-service emerges in these 
critical institutions.  Educational efforts should focus on the military’s role in a 
democratic society, the role of the parliament, and civilian control of the military.  
These civilian bureaucrats should also immerse themselves in defense-related 
matters in order to become specialists who can effectively challenge assertions 
by the uniformed military. 
The High Representative should introduce standards of conduct and 
education.  After the High Representative’s office is abolished, the EU and the 
United States should demand that certain qualifications be met by members of 
these important bodies.  It should also demand the removal of bureaucrats who 
repeatedly violate ethics or who improperly defy the chain of command in the 
pursuit of ethnic priorities. 
3.  The Military and Press Relations 
 We should continue to stress the symbiotic nature of a democratic society 
and the importance of the military to interact with the electorate in the pursuit of 
its defense goals.  Although the Minister of Defense has forbidden military 
members from speaking to the press for the time being, this prohibition cannot 
last for long.  Eventually new guidelines will have to be established allowing for 
the exchange of information through the press between the military and society.  
The interaction facilitates policy implementation at the direction of the civilian-
elected leadership. 
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 As the uniformed military develops skills and more effectively interacts 
with the press and the legislature, it can serve as a unifying force in the society.  
The military has a vested interest in emphasizing its multi-ethnic nature.  With 
that interest in mind, the military can serve as an example for the rest of society, 
as Bosnia-Herzegovina struggles to heal the deep wounds from the most recent 
civil war. 
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